Epstein Secrets

ely accepted that the Oslo framework remains the best means of securing durable statehood for both Jews and Arabs between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. However, the failure of the Camp David talks in 2000, the second Palestinian uprising, the aftermath of Israel's disengagement from Gaza in 2005,

an nightmare for its dwellers and a focus of criminal and terrorist activity in the eyes of the Jordanian authorities. The bigger question for the Hashemites is what will happen if these people remain permanently in Jordan, changing the makeup and balance of Jordan's population and turning the Transjord

ately needs a Palestinian state in order to preserve its own "Jordanianness"—an issue that is not, in the end, of much concern to the Israelis. The Hashemites know that EFTA_R1_02208417 EFTA02722927 and cannot be comforted by the thought that in the event a Palestinian state fails to materialize, Israe

leaving little over for naval warfare. In general, although Israel had excellent harbors and access to wood for shipbuilding, it never was a major Mediterranean naval power. It never projected power into the sea. The area to the north of Israel has always been a maritime power, but Israel, the area south of

r the Ottoman administrative district Filistina. Given the complex politics of the Arabian Peninsula, the British had to find a home for a group of Hashemites, which they located on the east bank of the Jordan River and designated, for want of a better name, the Trans-Jordan — the other side of the Jordan

time of Operation Cast Lead, Iran was EFTA_R1_00464363 EFTA01977747 steadily expanding its sphere of influence, from western Afghanistan to the Mediterranean. A subsequent U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf and an intensifying U.S.-led economic warfare campaign slowed Iran down, but it was the de

nefited from a strong patron in Iran. Hamas, on the other hand, enjoyed no such support. Mubarak's Egypt, Bashar al Assad's Syria, Jordan under the Hashemites and the Gulf monarchies under the influence of the House of Saud all shared a deep interest in keeping Hamas boxed in. Although publically these c