Epstein Secrets

iled in a brutal four-year civil war. But while Washington's policymakers are focusing on Putin's actions in Eastern Europe, events in the eastern Mediterranean continue to unfold with their own momentum—and it's highly unlikely that the Kremlin, however preoccupied it is with managing the situation in Crim

ent Mediterranean naval task force, part of Putin's project of reinvigorating the Russian military and projecting power globally. Without access to Tartus, Russian ships and submarines would have nowhere in the eastern Mediterranean to refuel. Russia also has a deep fear of Islamic—and specifically Su

s in Syria are to strengthen the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) vis-à-vis Iran and to undermine Russia's power and influence in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Israel shares the U.S. interest in cutting off Iran and Russia's reach into the Levant. However, security considerations surrounding the unknown v

f the Assad regime would almost inevitably decrease Russian power in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Syria has hosted Russia's naval base in Tartus for several decades and, since 1971, Syria has been Moscow's closest Arab ally. Syria is the largest Arab purchaser of Russian weapons and is seen

t for the Syria-Iran axis. Russia is rebuilding its Soviet-era naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus, which allows Moscow to reassert a plausible Mediterranean threat to NATO. Syria also provides Iran with a front line against Israel via Hezbollah in Lebanon, and that too can be a most effective anti-Weste

Iron-hard strategic calculations underpin his support for the Syria-Iran axis. Russia is rebuilding its Soviet-era naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus, which allows Moscow to reassert a plausible Mediterranean threat to NATO. Syria also provides Iran with a front line against Israel via Hezbollah

all the palaces in this world." He had pined to leave that poverty; he had come down from his mountain village to the port town of Latakia, on the Mediterranean, to get a secondary-school education; he had made it to the military academy, and the uniform had given him all that was now his. But he was then i

has signed a $550 million contract to sell Syria 36 combat jets. Two weeks ago, the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov called at the Syrian port of Tartus and, according to reports, dropped off a few tons of ammunitions. The Russians have a stronger stomach for the Syrian's brutality than does the Ar

02033696 EFTA02691523 10 Nevertheless, Washington has an important role to play in ensuring that the prospective economic bonanza in the eastern Mediterranean does not become a fresh reason for war. Washington should reemphasize to Israel, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Turkey that developing offshore discoveries

rivate "slush funds." Beyond that, Libya has also reportedly offered Russia a naval base in Benghazi while Syria has offered Moscow a naval base at Tartus. These events suggest that in return for arms sales host states are being pressured to give Moscow access to foreign bases. We have also seen this

n naval cooperation since the 1970s. In the past decade, the Russians have doubled down with improvements and investments in what is their primary Mediterranean toehold. In recent EFTA_R1_00230056 EFTA01842751 months, Russian and Iranian warships have docked in Tartus to show support for the Assad regime

ia's last opportunity to exert leverage in a region where, since the Cold War's end, almost every other country has turned to Washington for arms. Tartus, the second-largest port in Syria, has been the cornerstone of Russian-Syrian naval cooperation since the 1970s. In the past decade, the Russians h

its war against the atomized majority of its countrymen. Russia ignores European and American disapproval and does what's necessary to maintain its Mediterranean naval base at the Syrian port of Tartus, and pretends to continue as a rival to the power of the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. T

ntrymen. Russia ignores European and American disapproval and does what's necessary to maintain its Mediterranean naval base at the Syrian port of Tartus, and pretends to continue as a rival to the power of the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The conduct of the United States has been

an naval cooperation since the 1970s. In the past decade, the Russians have doubled down with improvements and investments in what is their primary Mediterranean toehold. In recent months, Russian and Iranian warships have docked in Tartus to show support for the Assad regime. Through it, they have reportedl

ia's last opportunity to exert leverage in a region where, since the Cold War's end, almost every other country has turned to Washington for arms. Tartus, the second-largest port in Syria, has been the cornerstone of Russian-Syrian naval cooperation since the 1970s. In the past decade, the Russians h

o in which an old ally takes a bullet. Nor does it want radical Islamists to take over the Arab state that hosts the last Russian naval base in the Mediterranean. Hence, Lavrov says, the Kremlin is not supportive of regime change in Damascus. But it may have no choice. Moscow considers the uprising in Syria

he United States lacks after letting the Mubarak regime go down quickly. The real question is whether Russia will keep the Soviet-era naval base in Tartus on Syria's Mediterranean coast. While the disagreement on Libya led to Russia's abstention in the Security Council and was soon forgotten, the spa

an and improve the human rights situation inside Syria is to remove the Syrian leader. It is true that Iran's prospects of keeping Syria as its own Mediterranean outpost are probably linked with the survivability of al Assad's regime. But his removal might well hasten the slide into chaos within Syria and in

ent in 2009 by killing hundreds, not thousands.) The Russians require stability in Damascus only partly for the sake of naval rights in the port of Tartus. Syria and Iran are the two remaining levers the Kremlin has in the Middle East. Moreover, the collapse of a pro-Moscow dictatorship in the Middle