Epstein Secrets

gress during its two years in office, mostly because the White House insisted on a 100 percent construction freeze in the West Bank settlements and Jerusalem as a precondition for negotiations. This was politically impossible in Israel, and also meant that Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas could not co

even limited military force, its survival was guaranteed. That is, so long as no great power was opposed to its existence. From its founding until the Camp David Accords re-established the Sinai as a buffer with Egypt, Israel's strategic problem was this: So long as Egypt was in the Sinai, Israel's national security

gn Relations The Israel-Hamas Conflict's Unintended Article 7. Consequences Robert M. Danin The Financial Times Obama's path to Xanadu runs via Jerusalem Article 8. Edward Luce \mt le I The Daily Beast Israel's Fatal Game Peter Beinart Nov 18, 2012 -- The first thing to understand about the war

me to power, Mursi's government has dealt with diplomatic norms in a civilized and harmonious manner, and has shown its commitment to the legacy of the Camp David Accords and other agreements. In this respect, it has outdone any previous government. President Mursi has closed the tunnels that were used to smuggle ar

t day in 1967 that a cease-fire in the Six-Day War was declared, leaving Israel in possession of the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, the Golan Heights, and Jerusalem but divided over what to do with its newfound gains. Israel withdrew from the Sinai in 1982 and from Gaza in 2007, and no one is discussing the Go

or George H. W. Bush, the two most recent one-term Presidents, who were both defeated despite some notable—even historic—accomplishments, including the Camp David Accords, under Carter, and the Gulf War, under Bush. The country remains closely divided, and the economy is teetering again. After several months of rela