Epstein Secrets

nect whatever dots are available as they make judgments about the threats and opportunities. And the sad reality is that, viewed from Washington or Jerusalem, the upheavals of the last 18 months have transformed an already difficult regional landscape into perhaps the most inhospitable strategic environm

ht be unable to do so in practice, if the runs it had to deal with were large enough. What, people must wonder, is the limit on the credit that the Bundesbank would be willing (or allowed) to offer other central banks in a massive run? In a severe crisis, could even the ECB, let alone the governments, act

o the idea of disobeying Washington than going to war over Iranian nukes. (Some are deeply troubled by the public bickering between Washington and Jerusalem in recent weeks.) But the sheer scope of resistance at home--by members of the public; the military's senior echelon; and now, apparently, Netanya

ing by the European Central Bank; refusal to support mutual liability for debt; and, finally, the transformation of the ECB from a copy of the old Bundesbank into a European Federal Reserve Bank based on the Anglo-Saxon model. What remains is the rejection of Eurobonds, but that, too, will ultimately di

to the idea of disobeying Washington than going to war over Iranian nukes. (Some are deeply troubled by the public bickering between Washington and Jerusalem in recent weeks.) But the sheer scope of resistance at home--by members of the public; the military's senior echelon; and now, apparently, Netanyah

opean Central Bank; refusal to support EFTA00711886 mutual liability for debt; and, finally, the transformation of the ECB from a copy of the old Bundesbank into a European Federal Reserve Bank based on the Anglo-Saxon model. What remains is the rejection of Eurobonds, but that, too, will ultimately di