™ undexd -05 875 90 -0.6 775 -0.7 675 -3% 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: Citigroup, Bloomberg. Source: Eurostat, Bundesbank. After four years that challenge some of the basic assumptions of efficient markets and laissez-faire capitalism, there is a pent-up demand for norm

ain & Portugal 16% 105. 14% 100 17% i 10% od B% 85 G% Germany ad Ao, a aa 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 0% aa ae ; Source: INE, CSO, ISTAT, NSS, Eurostat, Bundesbank, J.P. Morgan Ve7O gf TOG 188 TO 1D ZO aT Securities LLC, J.P. Morgan Private Bank. Periphery =Portugal, Ireland, lialy, Source: J.P. Morgan Private B

me to fail. Industrial production Index, 100 = January 2007 110 105 100 95 90 85 80 15 2007 2009 2010 2011 Source: INE, CSO, ISTAT, NSS, Eurostat, Bundesbank, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, J.P. Morgan Private Bank. Periphery = Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain. 2008 * The current EFSF lending capacit

re eventually shut down after the ECB (for now) rejected being the buyer of last resort for Italian government bonds, as the markets were hoping. The Bundesbank apparently has objections to the idea. This is a problem: Italy has issued around as much public debt as Germany, but is a considerably smaller count

re eventually shut down after the ECB (for now) rejected being the buyer of last resort for Italian government bonds, as the markets were hoping. The Bundesbank apparently has objections to the idea. This is a problem: Italy has issued around as much public debt as Germany, but is a considerably smaller count

16 Fig 8. 10-year government bond yields US UK Germany Japan 0.0 Source: US - US Treasury Resource Center, UK - Bank of England Data, Germany - Bundesbank Statistics, Japan - Ministry of Finance Interest Rate Index. Data taken as daily average yield on 30 December 2016. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_026696 --- PAGE

re eventually shut down after the ECB (for now) rejected being the buyer of last resort for Italian government bonds, as the markets were hoping. The Bundesbank apparently has objections to the idea. This is a problem: Italy has issued around as much public debt as Germany, but is a considerably smaller count

or parties are unflinching supporters of the European project, and will do whatever it takes to prevent a break-up. The objections from members of he Bundesbank are described as lonely voices of opposition that carry no weight [a]. But how large are the costs goin‹ to be? German politicians and voters may see

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in Brussels, London, Berlin and Paris who will carry the most weight in negotiations around and after June 17. We also believe that the ECB and the Bundesbank in particular need to be made aware of your work. In most of these cases we have networks that will help us secure meetings with you or for you. W

both sides are pretty far apart and will have to compromise to avoid a very negative market reaction to upcoming EU summits. Comments from outgoing Bundesbank President Axel Weber this week are indicative of the challenges here: "Strong German import demand is insufficient to compensate for the structural

ht be unable to do so in practice, if the runs it had to deal with were large enough. What, people must wonder, is the limit on the credit that the Bundesbank would be willing (or allowed) to offer other central banks in a massive run? In a severe crisis, could even the ECB, let alone the governments, act

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in Brussels, London, Berlin and Paris who will carry the most weight in negotiations around and after June 17. We also believe that the ECB and the Bundesbank in particular need to be made aware of your work. In most of these cases we have networks that will help us secure meetings with you or for you. We

May 17, a technocrat government will be appointed to lead the country to fresh elections as early as June 17 (high probability of this). Meanwhile, Bundesbank president Jens Weidmann writes a piece in the FT<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bc917f20-9607-11e1-9d9d- 00144feab49a.html#axzzluFwoqqQT> in which he arg

defense contract overrun, it's probably wise to start here and not with corrupt Greeks [15] or Swabian housewives' [16] financial wisdom. As former Bundesbank Chief Karl Otto Pohl admitted [17], the whole shebang "was about protecting German banks, but especially the French banks, from debt write-offs."...

Unfortunately, the ECB can't create jobs Employment percent change, O0O, saar 3% .3% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: EurostaL Bundesbank. After four years that challenge some of the basic assumptions of efficient markets and laissez-faire capitalism, there is a pent-up demand for nor

o fiscal transfers through joint and severally guaranteed Eurobonds. Will Germany cave in on this as well? Who knows. I spoke last fall to a former Bundesbank member and professor of economics at Bonn University who organized the petition of 150 German economists in 1998 arguing for a postponement of the E

opean Central Bank; refusal to support EFTA00711886 mutual liability for debt; and, finally, the transformation of the ECB from a copy of the old Bundesbank into a European Federal Reserve Bank based on the Anglo-Saxon model. What remains is the rejection of Eurobonds, but that, too, will ultimately di

st such requests do not have suspensory effect. (2) The auditor shall submit the report on the audit of the annual report to BaFin and the Deutsche Bundesbank without undue delay on completion of the audit. (3) The deposit guarantee schemes shall also notify BaFin and the Deutsche Bundesbank on request ab