Epstein Secrets

e Web site is in Hebrew). Israel built 2,534 housing units last year in the West Bank. Of these, about a quarter (694) were in two major blocs near Jerusalem, Giv'at Ze'ev and Betar Illit, and 537 were in two other major blocs, Modiin Illit and Ma'ale Adumim, also near Jerusalem. These four, which will r

l. In a rare break with Russia on the U.N. Security Council, China refused to condone Russia's moves in Crimea. Moscow's annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia was recognized by Nicaragm, Venezuela and two island nations in the South Pacific. That might be as many as will recognize the annexa

too far with their spying operations here. According to classified briefings on legislation that would lower visa restrictions on Israeli citizens, Jerusalem's efforts to steal U.S. secrets under the cover of trade missions and joint defense technology contracts have "crossed red lines." Israel's espion

rd-headed realists have argued that even if Ukraine shrinks with the loss of several autonomous republics (as Georgia did in 2008 when Abkhazia and South Ossetia seceded), the impact on American interests would be limited. They also argue that since it is now clear that no one (other than Russia) is prepared

ht call this the Museveni Paradigm. It's one of several arguments I've heard in the past week, as I've shuttled between Tel Aviv and EFTA00660558 Jerusalem, that have convinced me that Israeli national-security officials are considering a pre- emptive strike in the near future. Last week, I argued that

Moscow got its lease on military facilities in Armenia extended to 2044, and its lease in the breakaway formerly Georgian republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by 49 years. Russia's $22 million-a-year lease on the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan that can track Iranian missiles runs out in December. Aze

ents for Israel as part of a peace agreement. On the area most likely to prove difficult for Netanyahu to agree to at this time—the final status of Jerusalem—the United States is reportedly preparing formulas EFTA00684258 sufficiently vague so as to be unobjectionable to the Israeli leader or his coali

de by that promise is unclear. In 2008, he sent Russian forces into neighboring Georgia, ostensibly to protect the secessionist Georgian enclave of South Ossetia; the real goal was to weaken the pro-Western government in Tbilisi. Russia and the West both have legitimate interests in Ukraine and its future.

y's people that Judis blames, too, for the descent of Palestine into violence in 1929. In the midst of a year-long dispute over the Western Wall in Jerusalem, several hundred members of the Revisionist youth group "shouting `The wall is ours!' and carrying the Zionist flag, marched to the mufti's home, w

in Putin's equation the military risks would be EFTA00684330 negligible. Nothing happened in 2008 when Russia sent its military into Georgia and South Ossetia. In fact Georgia-South Ossetia 2008 might serve—with some modifications-as a blueprint. The main risks would be economic sanctions imposed by the W

tiatives in 2009, with Yuval Bartov as its first employer. Today Israel Energy Initiatives sits in Har Hotzvim, the modernistic office park outside Jerusalem where many of Israel's most innovative high-tech companies have their headquarters (some have taken to calling it "Shalom Valley"). Vinegar is a br

Some compared the arrival of Russian troops in Simferopol to the way that the Kremlin, in 2008, took advantage of Georgia's reckless bid to retake South Ossetia and then muscled its tiny neighbor, eventually waging a war that ended with Russia taking control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In a recent Lette