Epstein Secrets

vastating conflict. The French view is persuasive. Then along came the Iran nuclear dossier, a subject on which successive French presidents — from Jacques Chirac through Nicolas Sarkozy to Hollande — have had a consistent view: The Islamic Republic wants a bomb; only a tough approach will stop it. Once again

ds with the Obama administration. Top Saudi officials were angered by a previous U.S. decision to cancel a planned strike against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime, as well as what they perceived as Washington's hostile attitude toward the governments in Egypt and Bahrain. In response to these disagreem

eeblement, lest it re-emerge as the region's most EFTA00707114 powerful actor. They point to Tehran's support for Hizbollah and for the murderous Assad regime in Syria. The interests of almost everyone else are otherwise. Not to be tricked by smooth talking into making it easier for Iran to acquire

th Republic, following Valery Giscard d'Estaing. In 1981, Giscard was defeated largely as a result of the "betrayal" of his former prime minister, Jacques Chirac, who ran against him. In 2012, no one in Sarkozy's camp is betraying the president (those who are trying, such as former Prime Minister Dominique d

the Golan Heights, which could have tipped the balance of power with Israel. Rather, it only appealed to them for immediate assistance to keep the Bashar al-Assad regime in power. In Libya, the situation is almost farcical. In the year 2000, Muammar Gaddafi wanted to declare a war on Israel, yet he had no qu

em for immediate assistance to keep the Bashar al-Assad regime in power. In Libya, the situation is alm

th Republic, following Valery Giscard d'Estaing. In 1981, Giscard was defeated largely as a result of the "betrayal" of his former prime minister, Jacques Chirac, who ran against him. In 2012, no one in Sarkozy's camp is betraying the president (those who are trying, such as former Prime Minister Dominique

the Golan Heights, which could have tipped the balance of power with Israel. Rather, it only appealed to them for immediate assistance to keep the Bashar al-Assad regime in power. In Libya, the situation is almost farcical. In the year 2000, Muammar Gaddafi wanted to declare a war on Israel, yet he had no q

em for immediate assistance to keep the Bashar al-Assad regime in power. In Libya, the situation is alm

had supposedly wiped his computer clean in Hong Kong. It revealed that the NSA had targeted the telephones of three consecutive presidents of France—Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Francois Hollande. According to a former NSA official, this document, like the 2013 Merkel material, was not among the data on

ammad Suleiman, a top aide to President Bashar al-Assad who had been working with North Korea to build a

71 184 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS 2008. It revealed that a group of Israeli commandos killed General Muhammad Suleiman, a top aide to President Bashar al-Assad who had been working with North Korea to build a nuclear facil- ity in Syria. Israel had destroyed that facility in Operation Orchard nearly a year e

e final Camp David communiqué, to “declare” a Palestinian state unilaterally in mid-September. I spoke personally to Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac, and also dispatched Shlomo-Ben Ami, Amnon Lipkin, Yossi Beilin and Shimon Peres, who was Minister of Regional Cooperation in the coalition, on a ser

It was an attempt to engage with Syria. He asked me about the talks under Rabin and Peres, and my views on the possibility of a deal with President Assad. He also wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrangements to safeguard the country’s security if we handed back most, if not a

ill by now.” In fact, Assad would die of leukemia barely two months later. His immediate focus was on ensuring an uncontested succession to his son, Bashar. When Dennis Ross came to see me in Jerusalem, I think he expected to find me more distraught than I felt. Of course, I was disappointed. But I told

he final Camp David communiqué, to "declare" a Palestinian state unilaterally in mid-September. I spoke personally to Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac, and also dispatched Shlomo-Ben Ami, Amnon Lipkin, Yossi Beilin and Shimon Peres, who was Minister of Regional Cooperation in the coalition, on a ser

. It was an attempt to engage with Syria. He asked me about the talks under Rabin and Peres, and my views on the possibility of a deal with President Assad. He also wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrangements to safeguard the country's security if we handed back most, if not a

ill by now." In fact, Assad would die of leukemia barely two months later. His immediate focus was on ensuring an uncontested succession to his son, Bashar. When Dennis Ross came to see me in Jerusalem, I think he expected to find me more distraught than I felt. Of course, I was disappointed. But I told