Epstein Secrets

egin engaging with the strategists who had helped deliver electoral success for a trio of other centre-left political leaders overseas: Bill Clinton, Tony Blair in Britain and later Gerhard Schroeder in Germany. My main early political focus was on holding Bibi and the government to account in the Knesset, a

s’ Mideast envoy, Dennis Ross, as host, we met in Blair House across the street from the White House. I

Amir Drori, the head of the northern command. They had set up a rooftop observation post just a few hundred yards in from where I had landed with my Sayeret Matkal team a decade earlier for the Rue Verdun operation. It overlooked a pair of Palestinian refugee camps: Sabra and, a couple of hundred yards closer to

tment to the values of an open, tolerant democracy. But in at least one important way, I approached my new role as if it was one of our operations in Sayeret Matkal, or the need to reshape our armed forces when I was chief-of-staff. My first priority was to put in place the practical foundations for a successful

ion about our enemies, and make sure it got to the commanders and field units that needed it. And while the details of many operations I approved for Sayeret Matkal and other units remain classified, we did succeed in doing that — to take just one example, by finding an entirely new way to get intelligence from i

egin engaging with the strategists who had helped deliver electoral success for a trio of other centre-left political leaders overseas: Bill Clinton, Tony Blair in Britain and later Gerhard Schroeder in Germany. My main early political focus was on holding Bibi and the government to account in the Knesset, ab

s' Mideast envoy, Dennis Ross, as host, we met in Blair House across the street from the White House. I b

Amir Drori, the head of the northern command. They had set up a rooftop observation post just a few hundred yards in from where I had landed with my Sayeret Matkal team a decade earlier for the Rue Verdun operation. It overlooked a pair of Palestinian refugee camps: Sabra and, a couple of hundred yards closer to

tment to the values of an open, tolerant democracy. But in at least one important way, I approached my new role as if it was one of our operations in Sayeret Matkal, or the need to reshape our armed forces when I was chief-of-staff. My first priority was to put in place the practical foundations for a successful

ion about our enemies, and make sure it got to the commanders and field units that needed it. And while the details of many operations I approved for Sayeret Matkal and other units remain classified, we did succeed in doing that - to take just one example, by finding an entirely new way to get intelligence from i

n as Labor chairman, I used my acquaintance with a British Jewish businessman named Michael Levy to see what lessons our Labor party might learn from Tony Blair’s. Levy had been an early supporter of Blair and persuaded the Prime Minister to welcome me through the famous black door of Number 10 Downing Street.

British Jewish businessman named Michael Levy to see what lessons our Labor party might learn from Tony Blair’s. Levy had been an early supporter of Blair and persuaded the Prime Minister to welcome me through the famous black door of Number 10 Downing Street. After chatting in the front hallway, the Br

he summit’s collapse. My main concern was the possibility of violence. Even before returning home, I’d phoned Shaul Mofaz and Avi Dichter, the former Sayeret Matkal officer who was now head of the Shin Bet. “Let’s hope the violence doesn’t come,” I told them. “But if it does, make sure we are ready.” Though there

eer by training, he was a reserve army general who, when I was chief of staff, had been in charge of the logistics branch of the military. I gave him Sayeret Matkal backup as well, in the person of Danny Yatom, my longtime friend and former sayeret deputy. But all that was process. Winning or losing would come d

n as Labor chairman, I used my acquaintance with a British Jewish businessman named Michael Levy to see what lessons our Labor party might learn from Tony Blair's. Levy had been an early supporter of Blair and persuaded the Prime Minister to welcome me through the famous black door of Number 10 Downing Street.

British Jewish businessman named Michael Levy to see what lessons our Labor party might learn from Tony Blair's. Levy had been an early supporter of Blair and persuaded the Prime Minister to welcome me through the famous black door of Number 10 Downing Street. After chatting in the front hallway, the Br

he summit's collapse. My main concern was the possibility of violence. Even before returning home, I'd phoned Shaul Mofaz and Avi Dichter, the former Sayeret Matkal officer who was now head of the Shin Bet. "Let's hope the violence doesn't come," I told them. "But if it does, make sure we are ready." Though there

eer by training, he was a reserve army general who, when I was chief of staff, had been in charge of the logistics branch of the military. I gave him Sayeret Matkal backup as well, in the person of Danny Yatom, my longtime friend and former sayeret deputy. *** But all that was process. Winning or losing would com

ide world. Only President Bush and Britain's Tony Blair steadfastly reminded the critics of how the war h

inevitably, many Lebanese civilians as well, with a predictable surge of criticism from much of the outside world. Only President Bush and Britain's Tony Blair steadfastly reminded the critics of how the war had actually begun. The one putative victory for Israel was the UN cease-fire resolution that Tzipi L

the generals of our attack plan. There was still a core of ministers opposed: chiefly Dan Meridor and Benny Begin, but also Boogie Ya'alon, a former Sayeret Matkal commander and chief of staff who Minister of Strategic Affairs. But the confidence and detail with which the plan was laid out, and the fact that Bib

inevitably, many Lebanese civilians as well, with a predictable surge of criticism from much of the outside world. Only President Bush and Britain’s Tony Blair steadfastly reminded the critics of how the war had actually begun. The one putative victory for Israel was the UN cease-fire resolution that Tzipi

ide world. Only President Bush and Britain’s Tony Blair steadfastly reminded the critics of how the war h

the generals of our attack plan. There was still a core of ministers opposed: chiefly Dan Meridor and Benny Begin, but also Boogie Ya’alon, a former Sayeret Matkal commander and chief of staff who Minister of Strategic Affairs. But the confidence and detail with which the plan was laid out, and the fact that Bib