Epstein Secrets

paper Ma'ariv that he regretted not having killed Arafat when Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon in 1982. In 2003, then-Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that murder was an option for getting rid of Arafat. But is that any proof? When asked about this, Israeli officials say: "It has nothing to d

00 billion in military cuts set to take effect next year unless a new budget passes would be, in Levin's words, "a train wreck." (Defense Secretary Panetta has preferred the more apocalyptic "doomsday mechanism.") But while McCain has proposed protecting the defense budget by reducing federal spending

lpel, slicing and dicing Pentagon programs to save an estimated $490 billion over the next decade. As CIA director before his move to the Pentagon, Panetta oversaw the raid that killed bin Laden, handing Obama his signature foreign-policy achievement, and he jealously guarded his agency's turf against

ee top Obama Cabinet positions are held by Clinton veterans: Secretary of State Clinton, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. It's only a slight exaggeration to say that the many staffing changes since 2010 have resulted in the Obama camp running the campaign while the C

n Israel the threat is especially acute. And the concern comes not only from its most persistent critics. The former Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert have both warned of a descent into apartheid, xenophobia, and isolation. The political corrosion begins, of course, with the occupation of the Pal

having helped foment an image of Israeli obstinacy, the Obama administration was now using this image of isolation against Israel's government. Mr. Panetta's criticism was promptly endorsed by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a harsh critic of Israel, who said Mr. Panetta was "correct in hi

rsaries must view this deterrence capability in recent months: October 2011: Speaking to reporters traveling with him to Israel, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta raised provocative questions about Israel. "Is it enough to maintain a military edge if you're isolating yourself in the diplomatic arena?" This c

and occupation could hope to accomplish that, and not even the most fervent anti-Iranian hawks are talking about that kind of enormous undertaking. Panetta's estimate that an aerial assault would set back the Iranian nuclear program by only one or two years is in line with many other assessments. Meanw

/ BARAK / 115 Minister, I felt it was not my place to criticize Olmert publicly when Israeli troops were in action. Two days in, in fact, I told a television interviewer that the government had every right to respond and

e merit of being true: that Bibi was coming under pressure to shift our budgetary priorities away from defense toward social and economic issues. But Panetta understood that my request for a delay meant we were at least considering military action. He also realized that if we did launch an attack, it was i

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011891 / BARAK / 135 Yet especially with my main points of contact in the administration — first Bob Gates and then his successor, Leon Panetta, as Secretary of Defense —our broadly shared views, mutual respect, and the strength of the US-Israeli alliance outweighed any of that. Neither they,

significant numbers of US troops would begin arriving. As we weighed our final decision, I held a series of high-level meetings in Washington: with Panetta, national security adviser Tom Donilon, Hillary Clinton, and President Obama himself. Though not explicitly saying we were ready to attack, I left no

/ BARAK / 115 Minister, I felt it was not my place to criticize Olmert publicly when Israeli troops were in action. Two days in, in fact, I told a television interviewer that the government had every right to respond and

e merit of being true: that Bibi was coming under pressure to shift our budgetary priorities away from defense toward social and economic issues. But Panetta understood that my request for a delay meant we were at least considering military action. He also realized that if we did launch an attack, it was i

HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028268 / BARAK / 135 Yet especially with my main points of contact in the administration - first Bob Gates and then his successor, Leon Panetta, as Secretary of Defense - our broadly shared views, mutual respect, and the strength of the US-Israeli alliance outweighed any of that. Neither they

n significant numbers of US troops would begin arriving. As we weighed our final decision, I held a series of high-level meetings in Washington: with Panetta, national security adviser Tom Donilon, Hillary Clinton, and President Obama himself. Though not explicitly saying we were ready to attack, I left no

ls as he'd expected. This is not the first time the Israelis have launched a war for electoral gain. Shimon Peres did it to Lebanon in 1996 and the Olmert-Livni-Barak alliance did it to Gaza in 2008. What is important here is the immoral and short- sighted stance of the European and US governments; the

oop presence in Afghanistan concludes in 2014. But the scaling down there and in Iraq has already freed up resources to go east. Earlier this year, Leon Panetta, the Pentagon chief, said the US would deploy 60 per cent of its naval assets in the Asia-Pacificand 40 per cent in the Atlantic — from the previou

chil- dren — when Gaza is run by Hamas terrorists dedicated to permanent war with Israel and when Mahmoud Abbas, having turned down every one of Ehud Olmert's peace offers, brazenly declares that he is in a waiting mode — waiting for Hanky; to be- come moderate and for Isaacl to cave — before hell do

ministrat ion's approach :0 ttsrrorism almost sug- gesti: "he's wishing that this boentry would be at- tackle again, in order to make his point." Panetta told The New Yorker for an article in its June 22 issue that Cheney "smons some blood in the water' on the issue of na- tionaisecurity. Cheney h

agreement with =he Assad regime managed to survive. There have been four subsequent attempts by Israeli prime ministers -- one=by Ehud Barak, one by Ehud Olmert, and two by Benjamin Netanyahu -- to for=e a peace with Syria. This shared history with the As=ad regime is relevant when considering Israel's stra

al foreign policy advisers from his fir=t term advocated giving weapons to the rebels — Secretary of State Hilla=y Rodham Clinton, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, CIA Director David Petraeusand the chairman of the Joint Chi=fs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey. But the president overrode them, his cau=ion of no h