Epstein Secrets

ough any resistance and reach the Beirut-Damascus road. But after the Bekaa air battle, and the most serious air losses for an Arab state since 1967, Yanoush and I knew that international pressure for a cease-fire would quickly escalate. Aware we were racing against the clock, we began a co-ordinated push

tercepted the convoy. We chose a spot across from the Israeli 131 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011602 moshav of Za’arit. We equipped Yoni’s force with a pair of Land Rovers in Lebanese army colors and had them hide overnight in the moshav’s orchards, a hundred yards from the road on the Lebanese side of the frontier. The

steps removed from what was happening on the ground. But everyone involved shared responsibility for the failures — including the overall commanders: Yanoush, and me as well. That weight felt even heavier because the tragedy occurred only hours before our own force’s involvement in the Lebanon War was ove

lmost exactly the same as the one we’d planned. A force of nearly 700 commandos was helicoptered in to Iraq’s western desert, equipped with Jeeps and Land Rovers, and anti-tank missiles and laser targeting capability. They were also able to call on attack helicopters and F-15 jets if necessary. The operation d

ough any resistance and reach the Beirut-Damascus road. But after the Bekaa air battle, and the most serious air losses for an Arab state since 1967, Yanoush and I knew that international pressure for a cease-fire would quickly escalate. Aware we were racing against the clock, we began a co-ordinated push

tercepted the convoy. We chose a spot across from the Israeli 131 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_027979 moshav of Za'arit. We equipped Yoni's force with a pair of Land Rovers in Lebanese army colors and had them hide overnight in the moshav's orchards, a hundred yards from the road on the Lebanese side of the frontier. The

steps removed from what was happening on the ground. But everyone involved shared responsibility for the failures - including the overall commanders: Yanoush, and me as well. That weight felt even heavier because the tragedy occurred only hours before our own force's involvement in the Lebanon War was over

lmost exactly the same as the one we'd planned. A force of nearly 700 commandos was helicoptered in to Iraq's western desert, equipped with Jeeps and Land Rovers, and anti-tank missiles and laser targeting capability. They were also able to call on attack helicopters and F-15 jets if necessary. The operation d