Epstein Secrets

en brought in as the core of a peacekeeping force. But in the summer of 1981, new US President Ronald Reagan’s Mideast envoy, Undersecretary of State Philip Habib, had 193 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011664 brokered a cease-fire to halt Palestinian Katyusha rocket fire into Israel. It was generally holding. But fundamen

se-fire to halt Palestinian Katyusha rocket fire into Israel. It was generally holding. But fundamentally, Arik’s war plan was not a response to the Katyushas. It was a way of using military force to achieve Prime Minister Begin’s political aim: stopping the Camp David peace process in its tracks, and ensur

itical fortune, the mere prospect of Arik further expanding the 202 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011673 invasion had the effect of persuading Washington to send Philip Habib back into the diplomatic fray. With no early sign, however, of Arafat agreeing to leave, Arik now steadily tightened what amounted to a siege on west

at the “Litani line” might help impede cross-border raids. But especially since the remaining Palestinian fighters and Hizbollah were acquiring newer Katyushas, with a range of up to 20 kilometers, they could fire rockets over the security zone. My deeper concern was that we intended to hold the area with be

en brought in as the core of a peacekeeping force. But in the summer of 1981, new US President Ronald Reagan's Mideast envoy, Undersecretary of State Philip Habib, had 193 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028041 brokered a cease-fire to halt Palestinian Katyusha rocket fire into Israel. It was generally holding. But fundament

ase-fire to halt Palestinian Katyusha rocket fire into Israel. It was generally holding. But fundamentally, Arik's war plan was not a response to the Katyushas. It was a way of using military force to achieve Prime Minister Begin's political aim: stopping the Camp David peace process in its tracks, and ensur

itical fortune, the mere prospect of Arik further expanding the 202 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028050 invasion had the effect of persuading Washington to send Philip Habib back into the diplomatic fray. With no early sign, however, of Arafat agreeing to leave, Arik now steadily tightened what amounted to a siege on west

at the "Litani line" might help impede cross-border raids. But especially since the remaining Palestinian fighters and Hizbollah were acquiring newer Katyushas, with a range of up to 20 kilometers, they could fire rockets over the security zone. My deeper concern was that we intended to hold the area with be