Epstein Secrets

on a DFLP building a mile or so away in southern Beirut, led by Amnon Lipkin, the friend whose unit had faced one of the toughest battles at Karameh. Amnon’s paratroop force would land with us and also pile into Mossad rental cars. Our attacks would begin at the same time, with the maximum prospect of re

s, flanked by Talik. Across from them was Manno Shaked, the officer who had phoned me to tell me about the Sabena hijacking and who had now succeeded Raful Eitan as katzhar, overall chief of the infantry and paratroopers. Beside him were the two Mossad officers with whom I’d had most of my dealings about Beiru

Moshe’s tenure, he was able to bring in Amir Drori for a spell as his number-two. And early in 1986, he also brought Amnon Lipkin back to the kirya. Amnon was given my job, as Director of Intelligence. But I got the post which Amnon was leaving: head of the central command area. This meant that, for the

ys later, it was ratified by the government. There was only one vote against, from a former chief of staff who was now Shamir’s Agriculture Minister: Raful Eitan. I was one of rare instances in all my years in the army when I took a step back, appreciating a moment which felt special. It was not only, or even

1832 / BARAK / 76 many as possible of the Arab inhabitants to come under the authority of the Palestinians, and as few as possible under our rule.” Amnon’s bottom line was that we could not give up Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount, which, although he was a non-observant Jew, he called “the cra

ber one occasion when an air force general laid out the details of a planned helicopter-borne mission into Lebanon. I added a few remarks in summary. Raful Eitan and Arik Sharon were both ministers. Within seconds, they were peppering the general and me with questions. Why were the aircraft taking one route no

on a DFLP building a mile or so away in southern Beirut, led by Amnon Lipkin, the friend whose unit had faced one of the toughest battles at Karameh. Amnon's paratroop force would land with us and also pile into Mossad rental cars. Our attacks would begin at the same time, with the maximum prospect of re

s, flanked by Talik. Across from them was Manno Shaked, the officer who had phoned me to tell me about the Sabena hijacking and who had now succeeded Raful Eitan as katzhar, overall chief of the infantry and paratroopers. Beside him were the two Mossad officers with whom I'd had most of my dealings about Beiru

Moshe's tenure, he was able to bring in Amir Drori for a spell as his number-two. And early in 1986, he also brought Amnon Lipkin back to the kirya. Amnon was given my job, as Director of Intelligence. But I got the post which Amnon was leaving: head of the central command area. This meant that, for the

ys later, it was ratified by the government. There was only one vote against, from a former chief of staff who was now Shamir's Agriculture Minister: Raful Eitan. I was one of rare instances in all my years in the army when I took a step back, appreciating a moment which felt special. It was not only, or even

28209 / BARAK / 76 many as possible of the Arab inhabitants to come under the authority of the Palestinians, and as few as possible under our rule." Amnon's bottom line was that we could not give up Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount, which, although he was a non-observant Jew, he called "the cra

ber one occasion when an air force general laid out the details of a planned helicopter-borne mission into Lebanon. I added a few remarks in summary. Raful Eitan and Arik Sharon were both ministers. Within seconds, they were peppering the general and me with questions. Why were the aircraft taking one route no