Epstein Secrets

s sales to Israel but also in the joint attack on Egypt known as the 1956 Sinai-Suez War. The French needed Israel to help topple Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser who supported their opponents in Algeria. The side payment their Socialist leaders were willing to provide Israel was a 26-megawatt nuclear researc

Arabia and Iran, and add a new player on the arena of the ongoing Cold War in the region between major regional and international actors. President Mohamed Morsi called — from the heart of the Iranian capital — for the departure of President Bashar al-Assad. In his speech before the non-alignment summit, he

ls, stressing that the Gulf security was linked to their country's security. And certainly, Riyadh was the first capital to be visited by President Morsi to corroborate his insistence on the historical relations between the two countries, knowing that Saudi Arabia had decided to help Cairo by providi

times. In the aftermath of defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, Egypt's soldiers became the object of ridicule. The jokes got so out of hand that Gamal Abdel Nasser finally called on Egyptians to stop poking fun at the army. But Egyptians' political jokes do not come without a price: Through the years, hundreds

how presented by Bassem Youssef — who has been called Egypt's Jon Stewart — is evidence of this change. For a year, Mr. Youssef ridiculed President Mohamed Morsi. After the ouster of Mr. Morsi, Mr. Youssef turned his attention to Egypt's new ruler, Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi (now a field marshal). In so doing

as been called Egypt's Jon Stewart — is evidence of this change. For a year, Mr. Youssef ridiculed President Mohamed Morsi. After the ouster of Mr. Morsi, Mr. Youssef turned his attention to Egypt's new ruler, Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi (now a field marshal). In so doing, he incurred the ire of those

displays characterized all the major candidate rallies, and could reflect the old authoritarian rallies, or a desire for a galvanizing leader like Gamal Abdel Nasser, the nationalist colonel who took power in a 1952 coup, or simply the enthusiasm of voters who for the first time in their lives will likely get to

er in the audience named Yousef Eid Hamid, 38, said he was campaigning for Aboul Fotouh in defiance of his organization's strict orders to vote for Morsi. "We are not machines," he said. "You cannot love a candidate, and then just change." Backroom deals with the military will likely be decisive in d

tesman who can stand against what he portrays as a power-hungry Islamist tide, personified by the other two front-runners: the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi and the ex-Muslim Brother Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh. It is Aboul Fotouh who most worries Moussa's strategists: he is giving the former minister a

displays characterized all the major candidate rallies, and could reflect the old authoritarian rallies, or a desire for a galvanizing leader like Gamal Abdel Nasser, the nationalist colonel who took power in a 1952 coup, or simply the enthusiasm of voters who for the first time in their lives will likely get to

esman who can stand against what he portrays as a power-hungry Islamist tide, personified by the other two front-runners: the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi and the ex-Muslim Brother Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh. It is Aboul Fotouh who most worries Moussa's strategists: he is giving the former minister a

er in the audience named Yousef Eid Hamid, 38, said he was campaigning for Aboul Fotouh in defiance of his organization's strict orders to vote for Morsi. "We are not machines," he said. "You cannot love a candidate, and then just change." Backroom deals with the military will likely be decisive in

sembly, the largest of the world's political theaters. In this address he reiterated traditional positions expressed by former Egyptian presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, rather than adding any new notions regarding perspectives of "revolutionary Egypt," "future Egypt" or "democratic E

read, energy stability, security and cleanliness, as well as solving the problem of traffic jams. These priorities bewildered us, and through them, Morsi hit and missed at the same time. It confused us, because he included issues that are impossible to solve in 100 days. He put himself into a dilemma

ia, Israel was much more ambivalent about that outcome. The Israelis are always opposed to the rising regional force. When that was Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, they focused on Nasser. When it was al Qaeda and its sympathizers, they focused on al Qaeda. When it was Iran, they focused on Tehran. But simple

il of the Armed Forces and revoked constitutional amendments introduced by the military. There are two theories on what has happened. In the first, Morsi -- who until his election was a senior leader of the country's mainstream Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood -- is actually much more power

Egypt since its founding in 1907. Early on, the revolutionary Saad Zaghloul was appointed an honorary president of the club, a post later filled by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1956, who became president of Egypt that year. In contrast, Zamalek, which was founded in 1911 and known as the "mixed club" because it included

ears about the Brotherhood's secret designs, and the old guard in the military, the bureaucracy and the judiciary was relentless in undermining Mr. Morsi. Ultimately, the Morsi government never got the chance to succeed—or fail. But overthrowing Mr. Morsi wasn't enough for the old guard: In March, a

st powers in order to weaken its rivals - continues to rule the country under the military system introduced in 1952 when Mohammad Naguib and then Gamel Abdel-Nasser seized power. Militarism and patriarchy are inextricably linked, and both view masculinity as the opposite of femininity. If soldiers - and, by ext

27 August, 2012 Article 1. The Daily Star (Lebanon) The Arab Spring represents a leap backward for women Hoda Badran Article 2. AL-MONITOR Is Morsi Just a New Brand of Autocrat For Egypt? Alaa al-Aswany Article 3. NYT Has 'Europe' Failed? Nicholas Sambanis Article 4. Today's Zaman Europe'

at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense will be followed by a strategic realignment between Cairo and Washington. When they came to power in July 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser and his fellow Free Officers (with a few notable exceptions) were willing to join in a Western security alliance. And for its part, the Eisenhower

His Generals? Mohamed Fadel Fahmy The Daily Beast Is Morsy Staging or Reversing a Coup? Hussein ',Dish Article 5 The Washington Post Egypt's Morsi defies predictions EFTA_R1_00298242 EFTA01883823 Ernesto London() Foreign Affairs Morsi Makes His Move Steven A. Cook Article 7. Article 8

ee Officers Movement. 18 June 1953 The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) abolishes the monarchy and proclaims the Republic of Egypt. 23 June 1956 Gamal Abdel Nasser is elected President of the Republic of Egypt. 26 July 1956 President Nasser of Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal. 29 October 1956 Suez Crisis. Isr

, Palestinian Authority President Abbas and Hamas leader Meshal sign another reconciliation agreement after the failure to implement the Cairo deal. Mohamed Morsi is sworn in as President of Egypt. Israel launches Operation ‘Pillar of Defense’ in Gaza. Gaza War II: Israel and Hamas unilateral cease-fire. Presi

. Rami Hamdallah is sworn in as Palestinian Prime Minister. Rami Hamdallah resigns from his post. Massive demonstrations in Egypt against President Morsi. Egyptian Army removes President Morsi from power. Resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks in Washington facilitated by President Obama and Se