Epstein Secrets

igned the Camp David Accords. The two countries thus settled for the presence of missions, but the situation changed with the collapse of President Hosni Mubarak's regime. The day he became Egyptian foreign minister following the revolution, Nabil al- EFTA00712752 Arabi stated that his government did not pe

With all this history, Egypt rejected the "Turkish model" that Recep Tayyip Erdogan asked it to follow the day he visited Cairo following President Mubarak's toppling, as it rejected Guide Ali Khamenei's statements in which he said that the Egyptian revolution was an extension of the Islamic one. Cairo

" He has also testified before the Senate on the humanitarian crisis in Syria, calling on Obama to do more to prevent a "descent into chaos." 48. Vali Nasr A leading thinker on the Middle East, Vali Nasr is the rare breed of academic who finds himself profiled on the front page of the Wall Street Jour

was a "transition to democracy." That was never in the cards. What happened in Egypt was that the military came to believe that an aging President Hosni Mubarak was attempting to engineer the succession of his son, turning Egypt from a military EFTA_R1_00441463 EFTA01964624 republic to a dynastic state.

ry EFTA_R1_00441463 EFTA01964624 republic to a dynastic state. The generals fought back; when unrest surged, the military stood back and let Mr. Mubarak fall. The military, incomparably more powerful than either the twittering liberals or the bumbling Brotherhood, has now acted to restore the form

active and shortsighted, stranded between our professed commitment to change and our fear of chaos. One of the administration's most acute critics, Vali Nasr of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, goes so far as to suggest that United States policy is, whether by design or inerti

us. Fine, but relentlessly keep the pressure on them to improve their rule. Had we begun this process with Abdullah Saleh of Yemen in 1978 or with Mubarak in 1981, things could have been very different by 2011. But we didn't. TB: Egypt might be the test case. EFTA00683502 DP: Well, it's a bit late.

am. But neither is there any sign of new thinking in the White House. "I don't see how what didn't work last year is going to work this year," says Vali Nasr, who served in the Obama State Department before becoming dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He might not get much

gram. But neither is there any sign of new thinking in the White House. "I don't see how what didn't work last year is going to work this year," says Vali Nasr, who served in the Obama State Department before becoming dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He might not get much o

ed us. Fine, but relentlessly keep the pressure on them to improve their rule. Had we begun this process with Abdullah Saleh of Yemen in 1978 or with Mubarak in 1981, things could have been very different by 2011. But we didn’t. TB: Egypt might be the test case. DP: Well, it’s a bit late. Mohammed Mors!

gram. But neither is there any sign of new thinking in the White House. "I don't see how what didn't work last year is going to work this year," says Vali Nasr, who served in the Obama State Department before becoming dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He might not get much o

atorship or extremism. Three, and more difficult, cooperate with dictators but condition it on pushing them toward reform and opening up. We need the Mubaraks of the world and they need us. Fine, but relentlessly keep the pressure on them to improve their rule. Had we begun this process with Abdullah Saleh

olicymakers. The Gulf monarchies were shocked that the United States "abandoned" Egyptian President Hosni HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029717 --- PAGE BREAK --- Mubarak in his time of need in early 2011. Their leaders expected the United States to push for Mubarak and the Egyptian military to crack down on public pro

d to ever-tougher sanctions - and without promising Iran that sanctions will be lifted as part of a deal - then negotiations are unlikely to succeed. Vali Nasr, another former Obama administration official with expertise on Iran, suggested recently that there's not much more the world can do to sanction Iran

olicymakers. The Gulf monarchies were shocked that the United States "abandoned" Egyptian President Hosni HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029804 --- PAGE BREAK --- Mubarak in his time of need in early 2011. Their leaders expected the United States to push for Mubarak and the Egyptian military to crack down on public pro

d to ever-tougher sanctions - and without promising Iran that sanctions will be lifted as part of a deal - then negotiations are unlikely to succeed. Vali Nasr, another former Obama administration official with expertise on Iran, suggested recently that there's not much more the world can do to sanction Iran