Epstein Secrets

raim Halevy 7 EFTA_R1_001 07020 EFTA01785158 May 10, 2013 -- In October 1995= Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin telephoned Egyptian President Hosni =ubarak to inform him that peace was at hand between Israel and Syria. Two weeks later, Rabin was dead, killed by a rea=tionary Jewish Israeli fana

as held his fire in the face of great slaughte=, and truth be known, congressional and popular opinion have given him a p=ss. America has wearied of Middle Eastern wars. Syrian rebels sure that the Ame=ican cavalry would turn up after this or that massacre have been bitterly =isappointed. It's the tragic luck

ave the opp=site effect, enabling Egypt to pursue its goals of consolidating the military's authority at home and e=hancing its influence throughout the Middle East. Egyptian and Israeli leade=s must recognize that the ongoing struggle to secure the Sinai Peninsula =96 which the treaty established as a demilita

ou. We became pretty chummy with all these guys. Traveling with secretaries of state, we always went to Cairo first to consult with our good friend Hosni. Successive CIA station chiefs had very close personal relationships with the king of Jordan. There was little need to delve deeper, and it was a r

ble middle class. The gap between rich and poor will persist as a source of popular dissatisfaction. To make matters worse, by 2030 more than half the Middle East's population will still be under 34. This persistent "youth bulge" will challenge even efficient regimes, as demands for jobs, social services and u

ven b= an anti-western animus nor by a desire for an Islamist system. In Egypt a=d Tunisia, Islamist movements capitalised on the fall of presidents Hosni =ubarak and Zine al- Abidine Ben Ali. However, even in these countries (espe=ially Egypt), their popularity declined rapidly. As the impact of the A

ht should be given to wh=t Iran's breakout strategy might be—and how to obstruct it. Thomas Saether is a Norwegian security analyst specializing in Middle Easte=n affairs. He is a post-graduate of the MA program in Security Studies at =el Aviv University. Article 2. Financial Times Iran's diplomacy shows

main uncertain. Do you think part of the kingdom's anger with the United States went back to 2011, when the U.S. allowed former Egyptian president [Hosni] Mubarak to be ousted so quickly? I think there was some disappointment that the United States did not stand by someone who for 30 years was a ver

cretary of State is already sure to be defined by the success or failure of major U.S. diplomatic initiatives to secure compromises from parties to the Middle East's most deep-rooted conflicts. Three simultaneous negotiations now offer the prospect of achieving strategically important objectives: one to produce

fter it draws down forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's also likely dead wrong. What is true, however, is that political and military trajectories in the Middle East and South Asia are likely to increasingly challenge U.S. contingency access in the coming decade. The ability for the United States to surge large-sc

much differently than did American and European policymakers. The Gulf monarchies were shocked that the United States "abandoned" Egyptian President Hosni HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029717 --- PAGE BREAK --- Mubarak in his time of need in early 2011. Their leaders expected the United States to push for Mubarak a

fter it draws down forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's also likely dead wrong. What is true, however, is that political and military trajectories in the Middle East and South Asia are likely to increasingly challenge U.S. contingency access in the coming decade. The ability for the United States to surge large-sc

much differently than did American and European policymakers. The Gulf monarchies were shocked that the United States "abandoned" Egyptian President Hosni HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029804 --- PAGE BREAK --- Mubarak in his time of need in early 2011. Their leaders expected the United States to push for Mubarak a