Epstein Secrets

raim Halevy 7 EFTA_R1_001 07020 EFTA01785158 May 10, 2013 -- In October 1995= Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin telephoned Egyptian President Hosni =ubarak to inform him that peace was at hand between Israel and Syria. Two weeks later, Rabin was dead, killed by a rea=tionary Jewish Israeli fana

with Secretary of State John Kerry here this week, the =ussian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, hinted that Moscow might finally pressure President Bashir al-Assad of Syria to l=ave office. 2 EFTA_R1_00107015 EFTA01785153 "We are not interested in the fate =f certain individuals," Mr. Lavrov said at a late

y furt=er. Jerusalem, ultimately, has little interest in actively hastening the f=ll of Bashar al-Assad. Israel knows one important thin= about the Assads: for the past 40 years, they have managed to preserve so=e form of calm along the border. Technically, the two countries have always been at war --

e, the Alawite regime in Damascus and Hezbol=ah in Lebanon) is hell-bent on robbing them of their historic place in Iraq, their government's tilt to=ard Bashar al-Assad provided it. 5 EFTA_R1_00107018 EFTA01785156 It was a matter of time before =hese millennial conflicts were given new life by the Syrian civil w

untries have always been at war -- Syria has yet to officially r=cognize Israel -- but Israel has been able to count on the governments of =afez and Bashar Assad to enforce the Separation of Forces Agreement from 1=74, in which both sides agreed to a cease-fire in the Golan Heights, the disputed vantage poin

main uncertain. Do you think part of the kingdom's anger with the United States went back to 2011, when the U.S. allowed former Egyptian president [Hosni] Mubarak to be ousted so quickly? I think there was some disappointment that the United States did not stand by someone who for 30 years was a ver

confirmed by intelligence. But what of the President's other Syria `marker'—his August 18, 2011 declaration that "the time has come for President Assad to step aside"? That declaration, although repeated as recently as October 14 by Secretary Kerry, shows no sign of being pursued, EFTA00707181 mu

tary tools of influence that would offer a credible prospect of rescuing what remains of Syria's largely defenseless population from the ravages of Bashar al-Assad's conventional forces. With well over 110,000 killed and an estimated seven million displaced, one third of them overflowing refugee camps in neighbo

orcement powers? Not only that — the fact that even if it had enforcement powers, it would only remove the chemical weapons. But [Syrian President] Bashar al- Assad can continue to kill his people using aircraft, artillery, Scud missiles and other lethal means. This also followed the Chinese and Russia

ou. We became pretty chummy with all these guys. Traveling with secretaries of state, we always went to Cairo first to consult with our good friend Hosni. Successive CIA station chiefs had very close personal relationships with the king of Jordan. There was little need to delve deeper, and it was a r

ian behavior, and faux reforms. Then there were the adversarial authoritarians. Here, a smaller group photo featured Iraq's Saddam Hussein, Syria's Assads (father and son), and Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi. America sought to check and constrain their power, even removing one through invasion. But at tim

ven b= an anti-western animus nor by a desire for an Islamist system. In Egypt a=d Tunisia, Islamist movements capitalised on the fall of presidents Hosni =ubarak and Zine al- Abidine Ben Ali. However, even in these countries (espe=ially Egypt), their popularity declined rapidly. As the impact of the A

n talks in Geneva, fol=ows Tehran's willingness to go along with the Russian-initiated deal on =hemical weapons in Syria — where Iran is backing the Assad regime. The l=lamic Republic appears to be softening its longstanding policies in favour=of a more conciliatory approach. The shift is caused by the

oratory, you couldn't have done much better. Syria presents a profoundly different situation. U.S. policy has always been driven by the hope that the Assads would change and the fear of what might replace them if they fell. Three additional realities ensured a U.S. response quite different from the one fo

ng different. There simply is no reform option, and there never was. Genuine reform means dislodging the bricks holding up Assad- Makhlouf authority. Bashar Assad's open-ended presidency, the crony capitalism practiced by his cousin and other members of Syria's elite, the abuse practiced by the all-powerful secur

aris, or London. This is not an American administration overly outraged by the viciousness of dictatorships. Even in Egypt, Obama only turned against Hosni Mubarak when he was left with no other choice - although doing so against an old ally while sparing Assad suggests that Obama is like the coward who

cored the shift in a speech last week that her aides later said was a deliberate warning to the military council, which assumed power after President Hosni Mubarak's ouster. The military had initially pledged to hand over control to civilians by September, but it now says that a presidential election wil

e of the facts on the ground suggest so. With more than 350 killed so far, November has been the bloodiest month since the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad began last spring. Defections from the army, which started as a trickle, now look like a torrent. In October, the number was around 800. The best tot

A attacked the headquarters of the Air Force Intelligence Agency at Harasta near the capital Damascus. Since Hafez al-Assad, an air-force officer and Bashar's father, seized power in a coup in 1970, the AIA has been the nerve center of the regime's security system. Also this week, reports surfaced of atta

cent of the population. Thus, Syria's is a nationwide revolution against a minority regime. Almost all Syrians agree that the situation is untenable. Assad's policy of rule by massacre has few supporters outside his clan. Judging by the revolution's most popular slogan — "Assad Get Out!" — a majority may