Epstein Secrets

g the course of a mediation. Our decision whether to apply this mediation privilege .. . is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 501 [and] Jaffee'. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) . . . Recognizing that only those documents prepared for purposes of the confidential mediation are protected by the mediation pr

ivilege," and to provide the court "with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis, and leave the door open to change." Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47. Whatever the circumstances may be in other cases in the future, the facts of this case, when "interpreted in the light of reason an

ted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee' Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to prevent disco

would achieve a `public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.' Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S. Ct. at 912). The Supreme Court has identified several considerations relevant to whether a court should recognize an eviden

ted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee' Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to prevent disco

would achieve a `public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.' Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S. Ct. at 912). The Supreme Court has identified several considerations relevant to whether a court should recognize an eviden

d in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to prevent disco

would achieve a `public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S. Ct. at 912). The Supreme Court has identified several considerations relevant to whether a court should recognize an eviden

ed in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee'. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to prevent disco

would achieve a `public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.' Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S. Ct. at 912). The Supreme Court has identified several considerations relevant to whether a court should recognize an eviden