Epstein Secrets

tion. B. The Private Interests at Stake Are Profoundly Important. Plea negotiations are "rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust," Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10, and maintaining their confidentiality advances significant private as well as public interests. There is an "imperative need" that

ure, they will necessarily refrain from making admissions and concessions, either of fact or law, which could later harm their clients. Thus, as in Jaffee, the "evidence" which would be available for later discovery would likely never come into being. Fourth, there is a strong consensus in the states

gress rejected in enacting Rule 501, only one of which appears on this Court's summary in Adkins of the most important considerations identified in Jaffee - over the most important consideration, the strong public and private interests at stake. The Goodyear Tire analysis is far more consonant with th

r was to provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis . . . and to leave the door open to change." Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), the Supreme Court explored the considerations which g

rivilege under Rule 501)." Substantial constitutional and policy considerations, viewed under "the light of reason and experience" as Rule 501 and Jaffee command, support a common-law privilege over Mr. Epstein's plea negotiation letters and emails. A. The Attorneys Relied Upon The Correct Legal Sta

gent than in other circuits. [DE 106 at 15]. The 1982 standard the plaintiffs accuse us of hiding was effectively overruled by the Supreme Court in Jaffee, a 1996 case we cited throughout our supplemental filing. Indeed, we referred to Jaffee as "perhaps the leading case addressing Rule 501 and the com

ivilege," and to provide the court "with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis, and leave the door open to change." Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47. Whatever the circumstances may be in other cases in the future, the facts of this case, when "interpreted in the light of reason an

ge is rooted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee' Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to pre

would achieve a `public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.' Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S. Ct. at 912). The Supreme Court has identified several considerations relevant to whether a court should recognize an eviden

ge is rooted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee' Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to pre

would achieve a `public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.' Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S. Ct. at 912). The Supreme Court has identified several considerations relevant to whether a court should recognize an eviden

ge is rooted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to p

would achieve a `public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S. Ct. at 912). The Supreme Court has identified several considerations relevant to whether a court should recognize an eviden

ge is rooted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee'. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to pr

would achieve a `public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.' Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S. Ct. at 912). The Supreme Court has identified several considerations relevant to whether a court should recognize an eviden