Epstein Secrets

ge is rooted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee' Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to pre

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E

ge is rooted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee' Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to pre

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E

ge is rooted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee'. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to pr

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E