Epstein Secrets

oning rigidly left-wing positions that most British voters had rejected, he had created a formidable campaigning team under an ally and adviser named Peter Mandelson. When I asked Blair whether it would be possible to meet Mandelson, he said he couldn’t “give me Peter.” But he did put me in touch with Philip Gould

he had created a formidable campaigning team under an ally and adviser named Peter Mandelson. When I asked Blair whether it would be possible to meet Mandelson, he said he couldn’t “give me Peter.” But he did put me in touch with Philip Gould, the polling expert and strategist who had partnered Mandelson in

test prospect of movement on Oslo. In October, Bibi did finally try to seize the initiative. He wrapping up the redeployment details in a summit with Arafat and Clinton and Arafat in Wye River. But as soon as he got back home, he started backtracking, rather than risk facing down his right-wing critics in

attraction in getting a deal with Syria first: it would increase our negotiating leverage with the Palestinians. That would certainly not be lost on Yasir Arafat — one reason that I realized the importance of an early meeting with him, to convey my commitment to keeping the Oslo process alive, and, if possible

oning rigidly left-wing positions that most British voters had rejected, he had created a formidable campaigning team under an ally and adviser named Peter Mandelson. When I asked Blair whether it would be possible to meet Mandelson, he said he couldn't "give me Peter." But he did put me in touch with Philip Gould

he had created a formidable campaigning team under an ally and adviser named Peter Mandelson. When I asked Blair whether it would be possible to meet Mandelson, he said he couldn't "give me Peter." But he did put me in touch with Philip Gould, the polling expert and strategist who had partnered Mandelson in

test prospect of movement on Oslo. In October, Bibi did finally try to seize the initiative. He wrapping up the redeployment details in a summit with Arafat and Clinton and Arafat in Wye River. But as soon as he got back home, he started backtracking, rather than risk facing down his right-wing critics in

54 Chapter Twenty-One President Clinton and I met the next morning. My aim was to persuade him that the time had come for a make-or-break summit with Yasir Arafat. I suspected it would not be easy to convince him, and it wasn't. But I made the argument that if we were to have any hope of moving Oslo forward, we

appellate lawyers who are his partners, as well as several associates. I work on many of my most difficult cases with the firm—Dershowitz, Eiger and Adelson. Their work proved invaluable in the Sybers case, as it did in many others. We began by reviewing the scientific evidence, as we had in the Von Bulo

nt them in the failed efforts to fly the Palestinian flag from a flagpole in the Harvard Yard. They knew my negative views of their hero—I had called Arafat’s death “untimely,” because if he had only died five years earlier, the Palestinian Authority might well have accepted the Clinton-Barak peace offer—

they disagree with to express wrongheaded views, while insisting on their own right—indeed obligation—to express disagreement with such views. When Yasser Arafat died in 2004, I was asked by Palestinian students at Harvard to represent them in the failed efforts to fly the Palestinian flag from a flagpole in t