Epstein Secrets

insights. Through the eyes of the KGB, a penetration of American intelligence was clearly opportunistic. If these practices continued, they put the Snowden case in a new light for me. If Russian intelligence considered it worthwhile to send an ex-civilian worker at the NSA, such as Ronald Pelton, from Wa

ebruary 19, 2015 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020402 21 CHAPTER THIRTEEN Enter Assange 1. “Thanks to Russia ...”--Julian Assange, “How 'The Guardian' Milked Edward Snowden's Story,” Newsweek, April 20, 2015 “Julian Assange had made...”-- David Leigh and Luke Harding, “Julian Assange: the teen hacker who became insurgent

hor’s Interview with former CIA officer who requested anonymity (Hereinafter Source E.) 3. “The only person there to...”—Mavanee Anderson interview, “Edward Snowden's Friend Mavanee Anderson Exclusive Interview,” MSNBC,’Last Word,” www.youtube.com/watch?v=beQUMdolBWE 4. “He received an unfavorable evaluation,,,”—Er

on the NSA payroll in May 2013. If he intended to damage the NSA’s ability to monitor unsuspecting individuals abroad, he clearly succeeded. Just as Robert Hanssen had compromised the NSA’s interception of communication at the Soviet Embassy in the 1990s, Snowden compromised the NSA’s interception of Jihadist ta

entation of more sophisticated secu- rity procedures, such as the polygraph examination and extensive background checks. In 1995, eleven years before Snowden joined it, the CIA’s inspector general completed a study of the KGB’s use of false defectors to mislead the U.S. government from the end of the Cold

sses of a nation’s potential adversaries. The most impor- tant of these in peacetime is communication intercepts. It was just such state secrets that Edward Snowden took from the NSA in the spring of 2013. Before that breach, America’s paramount advantage in this subterranean competition was its undisputed domina

be used to motivate someone to “act alone” in gathering espionage material. I next turned to an even more important KGB coup with Cher- kashin: the Robert Hanssen case. From the KGB’s perspective, Hans- sen was an extraordinary espionage source. He was a walk-in who @ never entered the Soviet embassy or met wi

oward NSA surveillance. It there- fore seems entirely plausible that he found a co-worker willing to cooperate or, vice versa, a co-worker found him. Snowden might not have been aware of his new accomplice’s true motives or affili- ations, but without some co-worker’s providing him with entry to the sealed

ith author. | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 308 @ 9/30/16 8:13AM | | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019796 Notes to pages 23-25 | 309 23 The only person: “Edward Snowden’s Friend Mavanee Anderson Exclusive Interview,” Last Word, MSNBC, June 12, 2013, www.youtube.com/watch?v= beQUMdolBWE. 25 “was trying to break into”:

are sent over the Internet. He told Greenwald, for example, that encryption was “critically necessary” for anyone to evade NSA surveillance. Just as Robert Hanssen had deliberately compromised the NSA’s interception of Soviet communications in Washington, D.C., in the 1990s, Snowden deliberately compromised the

101 Even though Snowden had greatly exaggerated the positions he held with the CIA and DIA, no effort was made to check them by the team of journalists. Instead, MacAskill w

t does those sorts of things.” He had succeeded in defining himself for the public. The Guardian story accompanying the video carried the headline, “EDWARD SNOWDEN: THE WHISTLE BLOWER BEHIND THE NSA SURVEILLANCE REVELATIONS.” Snowden’s identity as a whistle-blower was now established in the media. Overnight, Sno

ly mean such a mole does not exist. Historically, we have many notable cases in which Russian moles eluded intensive investigations for many decades. Robert Hanssen served as a KGB penetration in the FBI for over 20 years without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames, acted as a KGB mole in the CIA for more than