Epstein Secrets

entation of more sophisticated secu- rity procedures, such as the polygraph examination and extensive background checks. In 1995, eleven years before Snowden joined it, the CIA’s inspector general completed a study of the KGB’s use of false defectors to mislead the U.S. government from the end of the Cold

sses of a nation’s potential adversaries. The most impor- tant of these in peacetime is communication intercepts. It was just such state secrets that Edward Snowden took from the NSA in the spring of 2013. Before that breach, America’s paramount advantage in this subterranean competition was its undisputed domina

e entirely hidden, is kept veiled, as far as is possible, to increase the value of the coup. “The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept, the Russian or Chinese intelli- gence service

“The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept, the Russian or Chinese intelli- gence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self- described “single point of failur

of undelivered NSA documents found in his home, @ the investigation was never able to assess the total extent of the KGB penetration of NSA secrets. (Angleton suspected Dunlap was mur- dered by the KGB in what he termed a surreptitiously assisted death, to prevent Dunlap from talking to investigators.) The

101 Even though Snowden had greatly exaggerated the positions he held with the CIA and DIA, no effort was made to check them by the team of journalists. Instead, MacAskill w

t does those sorts of things.” He had succeeded in defining himself for the public. The Guardian story accompanying the video carried the headline, “EDWARD SNOWDEN: THE WHISTLE BLOWER BEHIND THE NSA SURVEILLANCE REVELATIONS.” Snowden’s identity as a whistle-blower was now established in the media. Overnight, Sno

eper program through Poteyev soon after it began. The issue was how to exploit this knowledge. When I was writing my book on international deception, Angleton had pointed out to me that “the business of intelligence services is understanding precisely the relationship of their opposition to them.” His view,

final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence coup, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept the Russian or Chinese intelligence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self-described “single point of failure,”

s of undelivered NSA documents found in his home, the investigation was never able to assess the total extent of the KGB penetration of NSA secrets. (Angleton suspected Dunlap was murdered the KGB, in what he termed a surreptitiously assisted death, to prevent Dunlap from talking to investigators.) The Rus

insights. Through the eyes of the KGB, a penetration of American intelligence was clearly opportunistic. If these practices continued, they put the Snowden case in a new light for me. If Russian intelligence considered it worthwhile to send an ex-civilian worker at the NSA, such as Ronald Pelton, from Wa

ebruary 19, 2015 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020402 21 CHAPTER THIRTEEN Enter Assange 1. “Thanks to Russia ...”--Julian Assange, “How 'The Guardian' Milked Edward Snowden's Story,” Newsweek, April 20, 2015 “Julian Assange had made...”-- David Leigh and Luke Harding, “Julian Assange: the teen hacker who became insurgent

hor’s Interview with former CIA officer who requested anonymity (Hereinafter Source E.) 3. “The only person there to...”—Mavanee Anderson interview, “Edward Snowden's Friend Mavanee Anderson Exclusive Interview,” MSNBC,’Last Word,” www.youtube.com/watch?v=beQUMdolBWE 4. “He received an unfavorable evaluation,,,”—Er

to life imprisonment. Looking at his watch, Cherkashin politely excused himself, saying he had work to do. On parting, I signed a copy of my book on Angleton for him and thanked him for his insights. Through the eyes of the KGB, a penetration of American intelligence was clearly opportunistic. If these pr

Spy Case.” October 31,2011, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/201 1/october/russian_103111/russian_10311 1 > Author's interview with James Jesus “Angleton had pointed out...’ Angleton. “The situation suddenly changed...”-- Bill Gertz, “Counterspies hunt Russian mole inside National Security Agency,” Wa

oward NSA surveillance. It there- fore seems entirely plausible that he found a co-worker willing to cooperate or, vice versa, a co-worker found him. Snowden might not have been aware of his new accomplice’s true motives or affili- ations, but without some co-worker’s providing him with entry to the sealed

ith author. | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 308 @ 9/30/16 8:13AM | | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019796 Notes to pages 23-25 | 309 23 The only person: “Edward Snowden’s Friend Mavanee Anderson Exclusive Interview,” Last Word, MSNBC, June 12, 2013, www.youtube.com/watch?v= beQUMdolBWE. 25 “was trying to break into”:

94), xxii. @ 186 The CIA learned of this: Former NSA official who requested anonymity, inter- view with author. 187 “the business of intelligence”: Angleton, interview with author. 187 preparing these “Americans”: FBI, “Operation Ghost Stories: Inside the Rus- sian Spy Case,” Oct. 31, 2011, https://www.f

tates v. Har- old J. Nicholson,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm /ciaspy/affidavt.htm. 223 When it comes to recruiting moles: Angleton, interviews with author. 224 well experienced with false flags: Epstein, Deception, 22-28. 224 the “Trust” deception: Ibid. Also, Raymond Rocca (th

[DECEMBER DRAFT--- 287 pages] THE SNOWDEN AFFAIR A Spy Story in Six Parts By Edward Jay Epstein HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020153 Chapter One Chapter Two Chapter Three Chapter Four Chapter Five Ch

[TK] HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020156 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020157 Chronology 1: Snowden Thriller: From Honolulu to Moscow in 82 Days. April 8, 2013, Honolulu. Edward Snowden begins working as an infrastructure-analyst in training at the National Threat Operations Center for outside contractor Booz Allen Hamilton. June 5,

secution. To be sure, the view of those on the Snowden side of the divide is not grounded in legal definitions, but in a broader notion of morality. Snowden‘s supporters do not accept that the law should be applied in this fashion to Snowden. They argue that Snowden had a moral imperative to act, even if it

970s for my book on deception that intelligence services play by a different set of rules than historians when it comes to their espionage successes. Angleton, a famously baroque thinker himself, impressed on me the complexity of espionage. He said “It’s not enough just to steal a secret. It must be done in