Epstein Secrets

[DECEMBER DRAFT--- 287 pages] THE SNOWDEN AFFAIR A Spy Story in Six Parts By Edward Jay Epstein HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020153 Chapter One Chapter Two Chapter Three Chapter Four Chapter Five Ch

[TK] HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020156 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020157 Chronology 1: Snowden Thriller: From Honolulu to Moscow in 82 Days. April 8, 2013, Honolulu. Edward Snowden begins working as an infrastructure-analyst in training at the National Threat Operations Center for outside contractor Booz Allen Hamilton. June 5,

secution. To be sure, the view of those on the Snowden side of the divide is not grounded in legal definitions, but in a broader notion of morality. Snowden‘s supporters do not accept that the law should be applied in this fashion to Snowden. They argue that Snowden had a moral imperative to act, even if it

ity, wrote that Snowden’s action went beyond taking the handful of documents, such as the FISA order, “that addressed the privacy issue.” Instead, as Morell put it, “he backed up a virtual tractor trailer and emptied a warehouse full of documents—the vast majority of which he could not possibly have read

of which he would likely understand—T[and] and he delivered the documents to a variety of news organizations and God knows who else.” _—_As a result, Morell concluded “Snowden’s disclosures will go down in history as the greatest compromise of classified information ever.” General Keith Alexander, the he

led comprehensively, and each level of oversight, each level of re- sponsibility that should have addressed this, abdicated their re- sponsibility. —EDWARD SNOWDEN, Moscow, 2013 Wi SNOWDEN in Hong Kong was attempting to reel in the journalists, Lindsay Mills returned to Honolulu from her “island-hopping” trip t

as attempting to reel in the journalists, Lindsay Mills returned to Honolulu from her “island-hopping” trip to find their house partially flooded and Snowden nowhere to be found. In a brief note Snowden left her, he said he was away on a business trip and indicated that, at least tem- porarily, their eight

War. But the Snowden breach exposing military sources was an order of magnitude greater than any past breach. The CIA’s assessment was no less grim. Morell, the deputy director of the CIA in 2013, wrote that Snowden’s action went beyond taking the handful of documents, such as the FISA order, “that addre

A briefer that it was urgent for the CIA to be brought in on the case. After all, the CIA had employed Snowden only four years earlier. Specifically, Morell said, the CIA needed to find out three things: Had CIA docu- ments been part of Snowden’s haul? How long had Snowden been stealing documents? Had Sno

entation of more sophisticated secu- rity procedures, such as the polygraph examination and extensive background checks. In 1995, eleven years before Snowden joined it, the CIA’s inspector general completed a study of the KGB’s use of false defectors to mislead the U.S. government from the end of the Cold

sses of a nation’s potential adversaries. The most impor- tant of these in peacetime is communication intercepts. It was just such state secrets that Edward Snowden took from the NSA in the spring of 2013. Before that breach, America’s paramount advantage in this subterranean competition was its undisputed domina

arrant to investigate U.S. citi- @ zens who use Tor. The NSA is hardly immune from an attack on its own computers. As the former CIA deputy director Morell wrote in his 2015 book, The Great War of Our Time, many financial institutions have “better cyber security than the NSA.” The Internet certainly help

her actors. “For our enemies, having it [the black budget] is like having the playbook of the opposing NFL team,” said the former CIA deputy director Morell in 2015. “I guarantee you that the SVR, the Russian foreign intelligence service, would have paid millions of dollars for such a document.” If unlike

oward NSA surveillance. It there- fore seems entirely plausible that he found a co-worker willing to cooperate or, vice versa, a co-worker found him. Snowden might not have been aware of his new accomplice’s true motives or affili- ations, but without some co-worker’s providing him with entry to the sealed

ith author. | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 308 @ 9/30/16 8:13AM | | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019796 Notes to pages 23-25 | 309 23 The only person: “Edward Snowden’s Friend Mavanee Anderson Exclusive Interview,” Last Word, MSNBC, June 12, 2013, www.youtube.com/watch?v= beQUMdolBWE. 25 “was trying to break into”:

ay of the 9/11 attack, “Terrorist organizations around the world were already start- ing to modify their actions in light of what Snowden disclosed,” Morell wrote in 2015. “Within weeks of the [Snowden] leaks, com- @ munications sources dried up, tactics were changed.” Even more @ disturbing, suspects on

w with author. 134 The NSA had also notified: Former NSA executive who requested anonymity, interview with author. 136 NSA did not immediately share: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 283-88. 136 briefed by the NSA: See “Unclassified Declaration of David G. Leatherwood,” US. District Court for the District o

insights. Through the eyes of the KGB, a penetration of American intelligence was clearly opportunistic. If these practices continued, they put the Snowden case in a new light for me. If Russian intelligence considered it worthwhile to send an ex-civilian worker at the NSA, such as Ronald Pelton, from Wa

ebruary 19, 2015 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020402 21 CHAPTER THIRTEEN Enter Assange 1. “Thanks to Russia ...”--Julian Assange, “How 'The Guardian' Milked Edward Snowden's Story,” Newsweek, April 20, 2015 “Julian Assange had made...”-- David Leigh and Luke Harding, “Julian Assange: the teen hacker who became insurgent

hor’s Interview with former CIA officer who requested anonymity (Hereinafter Source E.) 3. “The only person there to...”—Mavanee Anderson interview, “Edward Snowden's Friend Mavanee Anderson Exclusive Interview,” MSNBC,’Last Word,” www.youtube.com/watch?v=beQUMdolBWE 4. “He received an unfavorable evaluation,,,”—Er

s around the world were already starting to modify their actions in light of what Snowden disclosed. Communication sources dried up.” What heightened Morell’s concern about this loss of intelligence sources was the discovery a 26-page document on an ISIS computer in Syria indicating that the terrorist gro

sumption which, following the defection of Edward Snowden to Russia, is hard to make prudently—then the int

cations from Russia. If one assumes that the Russians do not know that the channel is being monitored—an assumption which, following the defection of Edward Snowden to Russia, is hard to make prudently—then the intelligence gleaned from that channel can reveal the Kremlin’s activities and motive. If, however, it

, a former acting CIA director, casts light on the sourcing of the dirt in the Steele dossier. “I had two questions when I first read [the dossier],” Morell said in an NBC interview. “One was, how did Chris [Steele] talk to these sources? I have subsequently learned that he used intermediaries. I asked my

ar. • Russians Arrested In Austria Over Killing Of Chechen Dissident. • Southern Command Rebuilds Intelligence Relationship With Brazil Years After Snowden Damage. • Declassified Navy Videos Create Renewed Interest In UFOs From Congress. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS • Epstein Associate Maxwell Charged With

afficking, and terrorism financing." Brazil once provided "vital intelligence to prevent transnational threats from reaching the US homeland." Then, Edward Snowden published "a trove of classified information in 2013, revealing wiretaps of then- Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff." Intelligence cooperation and m

oward Moscow have done little to quell concerns that Trump may be advancing Russian interests and is consistently shying away from rebuking Putin." Morell, Vickers Examine How "Normal" Administration Would Have Responded To Russian Bounty Intelligence. In a Washington Post (7/3, 14.2M) op-ed, former CI

sumption which, following the =efection of Edward Snowden to Russia, is hard to make prudently—t=en the in

ations =rom Russia. If one assumes that the Russians do not know that the =hannel is being monitored—an assumption which, following the =efection of Edward Snowden to Russia, is hard to make prudently—t=en the intelligence gleaned from that channel can reveal the =remlin's activities and motive. If, however, i

a former acting CIA director, casts light on the sourcing of the =irt in the Steele dossier. "I had two questions when I first =ead [the dossier]," Morell said in an NBC interview. "One=was, how did Chris [Steele] talk to these sources? I have subsequently =earned that he used intermediaries. I asked m

1 Pa | | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019479 | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_rt.zindd 2 @ 929N6 5:51 Pa | | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019480 HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS Edward Snowden, the Man and the Theft Edward Jay Epstein AR ALERED A. KNOPE NEW YORK | 2017 | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_rt.zindd 3 @ 929N6 5:51 Pa | | HOUSE_O

| Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_rt.zindd 8 @ 929N6 5:51 Pa | | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019486 Contents Prologue Snowden’s Trail: Hong Kong, 2014 000 part onE SNOWDEN’S ARC CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 4 CHAPTER 5 CHAPTER 6 CHAPTER 7 CHAPTER 8 CHAPTER 9 Tinker 15 Secret Agent 22 Contractor 28 Thief 3

e also continued to invite activists to his CryptoParties, and he openly advertised them on the Internet until 2013. The CIA’s former deputy director Morell, who reviewed the security situation at the NSA in 2014 as a mem- ber of President Obama’s NSA Review Committee, found that the NSA in the post-Cold

101 Even though Snowden had greatly exaggerated the positions he held with the CIA and DIA, no effort was made to check them by the team of journalists. Instead, MacAskill w

t does those sorts of things.” He had succeeded in defining himself for the public. The Guardian story accompanying the video carried the headline, “EDWARD SNOWDEN: THE WHISTLE BLOWER BEHIND THE NSA SURVEILLANCE REVELATIONS.” Snowden’s identity as a whistle-blower was now established in the media. Overnight, Sno

lations.” (He was correct that Snowden had stolen a larger number of CIA documents that he had not turned over to journalists, as CIA deputy director Morell confirmed.) Whatever this material might reveal, the FSB was presumably aware of its existence. After all, Kucherena was on the FSB’s public oversig