Epstein Secrets

iplomatic approach to both countries. But if regime change in Syria is the goal, Security Council resolutions and six-point plans from the likes of Kofi Annan are doomed to failure. Only a E FTA_R1_02204140 EFTA02720611 combination of economic and military pressure, by Assad's opposition or outsiders,

Obama is seeking a bargain. So it's no wonder Tehran sought to add Syria to the topics for discussion at the last session of negotiations — or that Annan wants to include Iran in a new "contact group" to broker a settlement in Syria. The Obama administration rejected both proposals — because they ar

alf of 2005, a resolute Sharon carried out his plan to remove Israeli settlements and military bases from Gaza in August 2005, breaking up his own Likud party over it. This political move, which resulted in the creation of the Kadima party, would hardly have made sense had Gaza been Sharon's final

Abdullah of Jordan and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for a summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, I agreed. We wor

ained to end the violence if possible, not make it worse. When Clinton asked me to join him, Arafat, King Abdullah of Jordan and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for a summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, I agreed. We worked out a series of steps to disengage. Arafat was finally supposed to order the Palestinian Authori

he left. Right after Yitzhak's murder, I'd gone to see Zevulun Hammer, the leader of the National Religious Party. It had been part of both Labor and Likud governments ever since 1948, though not Rabin's. The NRP, too, had been drifting steadily rightward. But it still basically subscribed the idea of a

ained to end the violence if possible, not make it worse. When Clinton asked me to join him, Arafat, King Abdullah of Jordan and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for a summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, I agreed. We worked out a series of steps to disengage. Arafat was finally supposed to order the Palestinian Authori

Abdullah of Jordan and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for a summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, I agreed. We wor

he left. Right after Yitzhak’s murder, I’d gone to see Zevulun Hammer, the leader of the National Religious Party. It had been part of both Labor and Likud governments ever since 1948, though not Rabin’s. The NRP, too, had been drifting steadily rightward. But it still basically subscribed the idea of a

shback from within the military, although initial responses suggest that there's considerable support even within the junta for kicking Tantawi and Annan upstairs, and none of the signals that the military could respond with a coup. Although reports suggest that the announcement came as a surprise t

ted. Rather than rising to the level of a strategic dialogue, the secularist constituency of Kadima confronted the religious constituencies of the Likud coalition and failed to create a government able to devise a platform for decisive action. This is Israel's crisis. It is not a sudden, life-threat

e referendum. 11-25 July 2000 Camp David II negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat. 25 July 2000 Camp David Statement. 28 September 2000 Likud leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, prompting major Palestinian riots. Second Palestinian uprising (al-Aqsa Intifadah) b

a pariah for several essential players and was isolated in his Muqata headquarters in Ramallah. Under these dire circumstances, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a meeting in the conference room of his executive office at United Nations’ Headquarters in New York with the US, Russia, and the European

ese dire circumstances, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a meeting in the conference room of hi