Epstein Secrets

ng perorations heavy on Koranic quotations. But he also has shown a deft hand in outflanking the military, courage in standing EFTA00700342 up in Tehran and denouncing Assad's murderous Syrian regime, and — to the Western officials who deal with him — a strong sense of the need for inclusiveness. Th

hen he should have also been organizing an air campaign. That's what did the job in Bosnia, Kosovo and even Libya, where the objective was to oust Moammar Gaddafi and head off a bloodbath. It worked. Just keeping Assad's airplanes on the ground would have shown the Syrian military that it was saluting the wro

Section in Cairo Mojtaba Amani, "Saudi Arabia has even threatened to expel 1.5 million workers to dissuade Cairo from the resumption of ties with Tehran." Given these undeniable realities, an abrogation of the Israeli-Egyptian 1979 peace accords or the formation of an axis between Iran and Egypt is

nd Syria. In both cases, the insurgents are seen in the West as the "good guys," battling corrupt, autocratic leaders. Personally, I wish that both Moammar Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad would give up power tomorrow. But that doesn't seem in the cards: Both leaders have shown they're willing to kill thousands of

. Iran's successes, in short, have focused its regional rivals on it as the paramount enemy. Iran's doves have seized on these points to argue that Tehran should scale back support for Assad and push Maliki toward a more inclusive approach in Iraq. We can't know what is said behind closed doors in Te

f international terrorism. In response, the U.S.-sometimes successfully, sometimes not so much-has gone to war or at least gone after the likes of Moammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, Slobodan Milosevic, Ho Chi Minh, Manuel Noriega, Kim II- sung, and the Taliban. Like it or not, only the United St

would be an illusory victory. It can only end in defeat — and the strengthening of the insurgents' sworn Shiite enemies in Baghdad and, especially, Tehran. First, consider the brute demographic reality. Unlike in Syria, Sunnis are a relatively small part of the Iraqi population, about 25 percent — tho

m behind," was justified by "R2P" — the "o_sponsibility protect" Libyans, especially in Benghazi, from the supposed threat of genocide inflicted by Moammar Gaddafi. This humanitarian imperialism quickly became an exercise in regime change. But the prolonged attempt to assassinate Gaddafi from the air made no p