Epstein Secrets

tries. The question now is whether Obama's efforts to reassure Saudi Arabia on its commitments in the Gulf, and on the future of its relations with Tehran, will succeed in repairing the basic imbalance in relations between the US and Saudi Arabia — namely, the kingdom's loss of trust in the US. Will

In fact, the key initiatives of Sisi's campaign to emerge so far are Gulf-financed economic megaprojects (one in housing, another in development of the Suez Canal zone) with extensive military involvement. There is every indication that Sisi will continue to depend on infusions of cash and/or energy of roughl

rofile of its foreign policy: • Nabil al-Arabi, Egypt's new foreign minister has expressed Cairo's willingness to turn a new page in relations with Tehran, stating that Egypt regards Iran as a neighboring state, not a hostile power or enemy. • The statement of Minister al-Arabi came after two important

of Minister al-Arabi came after two important decisions were taken by the new ruling Military Council: (1) it allowed two Iranian warships to cross the Suez Canal on their way to Syria; and (2) it permitted Hamas officials to travel though Rafah's crossing, thus reversing President Mubarak's policy on this iss

ms and Hama, the popular upheaval against a monstrous tyranny, is left untended. Mr. Obama has never owned up to the fact that the cruel regimes in Tehran and Damascus were the ones he had been eager to court at the dawn of his presidency. Read the Wikileaks from Damascus in early 2009—they are full

he historian David Nichols put it, during a "perfect storm." Britain and France had invaded Egypt under the guise of bringing to a halt fighting in the Suez Canal between Egypt and Israel, and the Soviet Union had deemed this the right time to crush a Hungarian bid for freedom. Ours is a different world. Bara

a red light before Israel.' The crisis hinges on Iran's nuclear enrichment programme, which Israel believes is designed to build an atomic weapon. Tehran has long argued that the programme is for civil use only and says it has no plans to an build a nuclear bomb, but that claim has been disputed by th

Charles de Gaulle - will be conducting a naval exercise in the eastern Mediterranean. The task force could easily be diverted to the Gulf region via the Suez Canal within a week of being ordered to do so. The main naval exercise comes as President Barack Obama is scheduled to meet Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israel

North Korea, which succeeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and U.N. Security Council resolutions. If EFTA00671817 Tehran decides that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. The second possible outcome is that Ira

l consumption. Most of that imported energy comes through a handful of vital marine bottlenecks: principally, the straits of Hormuz and Malacca and the Suez Canal. Yet China contributes almost nothing to stability in the oil-producing heartland of the Arabian deserts and barely anything to the free movement

Section in Cairo Mojtaba Amani, "Saudi Arabia has even threatened to expel 1.5 million workers to dissuade Cairo from the resumption of ties with Tehran." Given these undeniable realities, an abrogation of the Israeli-Egyptian 1979 peace accords or the formation of an axis between Iran and Egypt is

n by peaceful relations -- or less tense relations -- with Iran." Just weeks after the downfall of Mubarak, Egypt allowed Iranian warships to cross the Suez Canal, provoking uproar among Israelis and even Americans. In succeeding months, the diplomatic flirtation between the two countries took an even more i

cess to U.S. markets. The Iraq War was designed to "shock and awe" that nation's ruler and to convince other opponents of the U.S., in Damascus and Tehran, especially, that they could be next. Meanwhile, it was hoped that once a pro-Western, democratic Iraq stabilized, it would give the U.S. leverage

benefits for U.S. national security, starting with maintaining the Camp David Accords but also including U.S. overflight rights and priority use of the Suez Canal for U.S. warships—both critical elements of America's ability to rapidly project power in the region. At the same time, the army's crackdown on pr

would make its peace with the status quo, renewing its partnership with friendly autocrats even as it engaged the hostile regimes in Damascus and Tehran. The United States was to remain on the Kabul hook for a while longer, but the greater Middle East would be left to its Furies. When a revolt erup

d by prosperity stemming from the "devout bourgeoisie" in the Anatolian hill towns. Egypt lies at the crossroads of the world, living off tourism, the Suez Canal, infusions of foreign aid, and remittances from Egyptians abroad. Virtue must bow to necessity: in the last year, the country's foreign reserves d

multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions and a phalanx of national sanctions. Many believe that only military force will stop Iran, but even now Tehran doesn't appear to take such a threat seriously. One step short of force that the "international community" has been unwilling to take is ostracizi

om his handpicked minister of war, General Muhammad Sadiq, due to differences over war planning. But after sacking Sadiq and successfully crossing the Suez Canal in 1973, Sadat became his EFTA_R1_00298265 EFTA01883846 own man. From then on, he was able to initiate fundamental changes to Cairo's foreign po