Epstein Secrets

ility of their regimes. While Hamas began questioning the benefits of its political experiment, Iran saw an opportunity to foster a militant proxy. Tehran saw an increasingly strained relationship between Saudi Arabia and Hamas, and it took advantage to increase funding and weapons supplies to the gr

incursion. By the end of the campaign, nearly 1,000 poorly guided shorter-range rockets and mortar shells hit southern Israel, reaching as far as Beersheba and Yavne. Several senior Hamas commanders and hundreds of militants were killed in the fighting. Israel Defense Forces figures showed that 10 IDF

wrong) the decision-making and implementation protocols of the Iranian government, how the Iranian people and military would react to an attack, what Tehran would ask its allies and proxies to do, and what in fact they will do. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018104 --- PAGE BREAK --- 21 Enemy disinformation, as well

ually increasing range, bringing more of central and southern Israel under threat with every upgrade. Hamas can now reach central Tel Aviv and beyond Beersheba in southern Israel. Iran will likely supplement this proxy war by exploiting “images of victory’—such as sinking a U.S. naval unit or displaying U.S

GREECE Istanbul, » . POERERIANGS a 40° 4 . Trabzon BARU Lo aoe @ANKARA ise) S . TURKEY AZERBAUJAN 2 lzmir G o} ATHENS Konya Tabriz ° Antalya, Adana, TEHRAN © Rhodes | = NICOSIA: ia rate 5 Latakia | R A N Y, CYPRUS Tripoli ¢ Hamadan Ai te, BEIRUT ¢, 7aneay Spx LEBANON Esfahan® Haifa I R A Q bs, . ISRAEL A

an state Areas annexed to Israel =a=amnmn_ Safe passage route A International military presence (36 months) we 1967 boundary \ Jerusalem ro} w= Beersheba | SOURCES: D. Ross "The Missing Peace” \ and "An Atlas of Palestine” (ARI, 2000) | 31° \ fog 31 \ Oo 5 10 15 KILOMETERS ‘ ! \ 0 5 10 15 MILES aa |