Epstein Secrets

r example, coefficient ti in Antal et al, 2008). Wild and Traulsen (2007) argue that the general payoff

ho-interacts-with-whom changes during the evolutionary process (Fig 2.2). For mathematical convenience we con- sider evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process with constant population size [63]. A frequency dependent Moran process [110] or a pairwise comparison process [156], which is more realist

t in common, they interact several times. An interaction is given by the usual payoff matrix. The system evolves according to synchronous updating (Wright-Fisher process). There are discrete, non-overlapping generations. All individuals update at the same time. The population size is constant. Individuals re

eiber 2001, Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Wild and Taylor 2004, Traulsen et al 2005, Antal & Sch

Evolutionary updating occurs according to the frequency dependent Moran process (Nowak et al, 2004; Taylor et al, 2004) or the frequency dependent Wright-Fisher process (Imhof & Nowak, 2006). Reproduction is proportional to fitness and subject to a mutation rate u. With probability 1 — u the offspring inheri

A., 2005. Evolutionary cycles of coop- eration and defection. PNAS, 102, 1079710800. [63] Imhof LA, Nowak MA, 2006. Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process. J. Math. Biol 52, 667-681. [64] Jansen VA, van Baalen M, 2006. Altruism through beard chromodynkunics. Nature, 440, 663-666. [65] Kandor

hting or fleeing. Evol Ecol Res 9: 395-408. 195. Wild G, A Traulsen (2007). The different limits of wea

nergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas. I theor Biol 239: 195-202. 125. Imhof LA, MA Nowak (2006). Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process. Math Biol 52: 667-681. 126. Iwasa Y, MA Nowak, F Michor (2006). Evolution of resistance during clonal expansion. Genetics 172: 2557-2566.