Epstein Secrets

"civil" in nature, under the analysis provided by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244,

ncy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability

ded version. Even if one were to argue that the statute is "civil" and the damages thereunder are "civil" in nature, under the analysis provided by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994), pertaining to civil statutes, not only is there no express intent by Congress

Entered on FLSD Docket 03/05:2010 Page 21 of 36 Jane Doe v. Epstein Case No. 08-CV-80893-Marra-Johnson Page 21 double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal disabilities like insanity

771 (a) (emphasis added). 8! U.S. Const. amend. V; see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV (due process right in state proceedings). 82 See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)). 83 See, e.g., Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Comtys. fo

interests of the victim. 774 Having seen the Advisory Committee proposal and accompanying note, I am concerned that the limits on subpoenas found in the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Nixon 734 might be vitiated by a broad rule. To ensure courts consistently apply Nixon's substantive and procedural stan