Epstein Secrets

work product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very rare and extraordinary circumstances." Cox I. Adm'r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1422 (11th Cir. 1994). In the context of government attorneys, the "work-product privilege applies to ... discussions between prosecu

t plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton I. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to asses

work product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very rare and extraordinary circumstances." Cox v. Adm'r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1422 (11th Cir. 1994). In the context of government attorneys, the "work-product privilege applies to ... discussions between prosecu

t plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to asses

work product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very rare and extraordinary circumstances." Cox v. Adm'r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1422 (11th Cir. 1994). In the context of government attorneys, the "work-product privilege applies to . . . discussions between prose

t plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[lin addition to asses

work product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very rare and extraordinary circumstances." Cox v. Adm'r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1422 (11th Cir. 1994). In the context of government attorneys, the "work-product privilege applies to ... discussions between prosecu

t plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to asses