Epstein Secrets

lestine PLC Palestinian Legislative Council PLO Palestine Liberation Organization SLA South Lebanon Army TIPH Temporary Internati

cent of the Golan Heights, it still fell short of Assad’s demand for a return to the 4 June 1967 lines, a

Resolu- tions 425 and 426. 18 June 2000 The UN Security Council confirms Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in a Presidential Statement. 10 July 2000 Bashar al-Assad is elected President of Syria in a nationwide referendum. 11-25 July 2000 Camp David II negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat. 25 July 2

rian peace deal that was not to come. Despite Barak offering Syrian President Hafez al-Assad 99 per cent of the Golan Heights, it still fell short of Assad’s demand for a return to the 4 June 1967 lines, and the Syria track subsequently crumbled. This put Arafat on the spot: how could he now, in front of

ent that exercises authority in the West Bank, is committed to the Quartet principles and the Arab Peace Initiative and respects the commitments of the Palestine Liberation Organization. • Call for both states to engage in good faith negotiations on the basis of this and previous relevant resolutions and agreements in order to res

ther bureaucracies, and thus had no legitimacy. Marcus Aurelius was one thing; Tunisia's Zine el- Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Syria's Bashar al- Assad, quite another. Certainly, the Arab Spring has proved much: that there is no otherness to Arab civilization, that Arabs yearn for univers

r supply have diminished. There are three reasons. First, the most substantial fallout from the Arab world's recent upheaval is behind us. Syria's Bashar al-Assad continues to fight for survival and Yemen continues to flirt with failed-state status, but the Gulf's major oil-producing states are quite stable.

cracies, and thus had no legitimacy. Marcus Aurelius was one thing; Tunisia's Zine el- Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Syria's Bashar al- Assad, quite another. Certainly, the Arab Spring has proved much: that there is no otherness to Arab civilization, that Arabs yearn for universal values

hat makes little sense to anyone other than Hamas operatives; or to rejoin and reconfigure Palestinian national institutions EFTA00719584 such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, to continue the struggle nationally and regionally. This raises the third level of analysis of Hamas' decision, which relates to the condition of

directly, it is now engulfing Syria, and Syria is basically their only true ally in the region. And it is our estimation that [President Bashar al- Assad's] days are numbered. It's a matter not of if, but when. Now, can we accelerate that? We're working with the world community to try to do that. It

. But more directly, it is now engulfing Syria, and Syria is basically their only true ally in the region. And it is our estimation that [President Bashar al- Assad's] days are numbered. It's a matter not of if, but when. Now, can we accelerate that? We're working with the world community to try to do

rected toward Syria and its weapons of mass destruction. When the Syrian uprising began more than a year ago, few predicted the regime of President Bashar al-Assad would ever teeter toward collapse. Now, though, the demise of Damascus's current leadership appears inevitable, and Syria's revolution will likely

st credos cannot be taken seriously. A case in point is the demand that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state. Despite the fact that the Palestine Liberation Organization has recognized the state of Israel for more than 20 years — with no reciprocal recognition by Israel of the state of Palestine — Prime Minister Ben

lease Washington, or Moscow, while complaining to journalists like me that Kerry's diplomacy is based on fantasy. Who can imagine Syrian President Bashar al-Assad placidly agreeing to step down? Or Netanyahu ceding East Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley to the Palestinians and their security forces? Diplomatic

because the Soviet Union still presented a tangible and inescapable threat to the West. A Syrian peace conference could not succeed now because the Assad regime is in no immediate danger of losing on the battlefield. For Obama, succeeding in even the limited objectives he has set for the Middle East

inian statelet that makes litt=e sense to anyone other than Hamas operatives; or to rejoin and reconfigure Palestinian national institutions=such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, to continue the struggle na=ionally and regionally. This raises the thi=d level of analysis of Hamas' decision, which relates to the condition o=

m. But more directly, it is now engulfing Syria, and Syria is basically their only true ally in =he region. And it is our estimation that [President Bashar al-Assad's] day= are numbered. It's a matter not of if, but when. Now, can we accelerate t=at? We're working with the world community to try to do that. It is

Global Security Newswire <http://www.nti.oregsn/article/us-watching-syrian-chemica=-arms-amid-fear-attack-diversionk recently asserted that "[tJhe Assad regime is thought to possess between 100 and 200 Scud missiles carrying wa=heads loaded with sarin nerve agent. The government is also believed to h

is latest signed document may face the same fate. The rival movements have to negotiate the terms of complex power sharing and the restructuring of the Palestine Liberation Organization, from which Hamas has been excluded. It remained unclear how some of the Hamas leaders in Gaza, who are destined to lose their jobs in the new arr

rs the uprising in Syria to be, to some extent, the handiwork of the United States and its European allies. This perception is fundamentally wrong: Assad's is an oppressive, minority-Alawi regime. It came to power via a 1970 coup. In 1982, the current dictator's father, then president Hafez al- Assad

akes in Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi and even al-Qaeda- affiliated factions. Despite President Obama's "reset" policy, Russia continues to support [4] Bashar al-Assad's brutal regime. But in a rare admission of reality, a senior Middle East hand acknowledged that Russia must step back. Mikhail Margelov, chair of th

occupation has lasted too long. Hollywood gets it; Washington should too. Maen Rashid Areikat is chief representative of the general delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United States. Article 2. N YT Beltway Foreign Policy RogerCohen February 18, 2013 -- "IT is not going too far to say that American for

, the question may well be redundant because military intervention is already taking place in a variety of ways. Russia and Iran continue to supply Bashar Al-Assad's forces with arms and military advice, while elements of Lebanese Hezbollah may also be involved in fighting anti-Assad units. At the other end of

folly of a `game- changing' intervention. Such a course of action must have the magnitude to tip the balance in favor of the rebels and accelerate Assad's downfall. Those opposed to intervention represent a spectrum of opinions. Some are pacifists who oppose all wars. Others are political orphans o

a government that did not want that arrangement to break. Israel still faced a formally hostile Syria. Syria had invaded Lebanon in 1976 to crush the Palestine Liberation Organization based there and reconsolidate its hold over Lebanon, but knew it could not attack Israel by itself. Syria remained content reaching informal under

involve a loose coalition of Sunnis including elements of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists. Though Israel far preferred Syrian President Bashar al Assad to them, al Assad himself was shifting his behavior. The more pressure he came under, the more he became dependent on Iran. Israel began facing the

FTA_R1_00298505 EFTA01884024 regime of the al Assad family is in serious trouble. As mentioned, the

on the agenda of Benjamin Netanyahu, whose reelection campaign is premised on the belief that Israel has no Palestinian partner. But dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization was once deemed unthinkable, too, and over time Israelis leaders realized that since they could not destroy the PLO militarily, they were better o

clipse the regional and international focus on Syria, where hundreds of people have been slaughtered on a daily basis for the past year and a half. Assad will likely exploit this by ratcheting up his brutality against Syrian rebels and civilians while eyes are gazed elsewhere. While the course of Ope

n, Gadhafi used heavy weapons from the start, but Assad hasn't. SPIEGEL: Yet tanks have been deployed in

e refused to say exactly what a U.N. membership application or General Assembly resolution might say. Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization's executive committee, discussed with The Times what Palestinians are planning and why he thinks the U.N. bid, if unsuccessful, could spell the end of

a key position in the region. What happens there has a direct impact on Lebanon and Iraq. In addition, Gadhafi used heavy weapons from the start, but Assad hasn't. SPIEGEL: Yet tanks have been deployed in Hama, Homs and Latakia for some time. Elaraby: When I flew to Syria 10 days after taking office, t