Epstein Secrets

om: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen ‹ > Subject: September 4 update Date: Thu, 06 Sep 2012 20:42:41 +0000 4 September, 2012 Article I. Al Monitor Why Shimon Peres Still Matters Shai Feldman Article 2. Al-Hayat Egypt Infiltrates the Turkish-Saudi-Iranian Trio? George Semaan Article 3. The New Yorker Two

ublic expression to his opposition to a possible Israeli military strike against Iran's nuclear installations. This followed two years during which Peres is said to have counseled Israel's leaders in closed quarters against the ramifications of such an attack. Giving a number of separate interviews o

00 billion in military cuts set to take effect next year unless a new budget passes would be, in Levin's words, "a train wreck." (Defense Secretary Panetta has preferred the more apocalyptic "doomsday mechanism.") But while McCain has proposed protecting the defense budget by reducing federal spending

lpel, slicing and dicing Pentagon programs to save an estimated $490 billion over the next decade. As CIA director before his move to the Pentagon, Panetta oversaw the raid that killed bin Laden, handing Obama his signature foreign-policy achievement, and he jealously guarded his agency's turf against

ee top Obama Cabinet positions are held by Clinton veterans: Secretary of State Clinton, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. It's only a slight exaggeration to say that the many staffing changes since 2010 have resulted in the Obama camp running the campaign while the C

ing his own praises again. Whether this will persuade any listeners not already inclined to vote for Obama is doubtful. His reference to "my friend Shimon Peres" was the kind of Washington nonsense that can make a sophisticated audience grimace. Similarly, his announcement at AIPAC that he will this spring

he kind of Washington nonsense that can make a sophisticated audience grimace. Similarly, his announcement at AIPAC that he will this spring award Peres the Medal of Freedom was pandering of the highest order. But the part of speech that most listeners were focused on was, of course, the section on

having helped foment an image of Israeli obstinacy, the Obama administration was now using this image of isolation against Israel's government. Mr. Panetta's criticism was promptly endorsed by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a harsh critic of Israel, who said Mr. Panetta was "correct in hi

rsaries must view this deterrence capability in recent months: October 2011: Speaking to reporters traveling with him to Israel, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta raised provocative questions about Israel. "Is it enough to maintain a military edge if you're isolating yourself in the diplomatic arena?" This c

and occupation could hope to accomplish that, and not even the most fervent anti-Iranian hawks are talking about that kind of enormous undertaking. Panetta's estimate that an aerial assault would set back the Iranian nuclear program by only one or two years is in line with many other assessments. Meanw

he had acted against the advice of the then-heads of both the Mossad and military intelligence, the chairman of our nuclear energy commission, and of Shimon Peres, who was head of the Labor opposition. But as we neared our final, formal decision, we were forced into another delay. In the summer of 2012, an unr

n of our nuclear energy commission, and of Shimon Peres, who was head of the Labor opposition. But as we

e merit of being true: that Bibi was coming under pressure to shift our budgetary priorities away from defense toward social and economic issues. But Panetta understood that my request for a delay meant we were at least considering military action. He also realized that if we did launch an attack, it was i

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011891 / BARAK / 135 Yet especially with my main points of contact in the administration — first Bob Gates and then his successor, Leon Panetta, as Secretary of Defense —our broadly shared views, mutual respect, and the strength of the US-Israeli alliance outweighed any of that. Neither they,

significant numbers of US troops would begin arriving. As we weighed our final decision, I held a series of high-level meetings in Washington: with Panetta, national security adviser Tom Donilon, Hillary Clinton, and President Obama himself. Though not explicitly saying we were ready to attack, I left no

n of our nuclear energy commission, and of Shimon Peres, who was head of the Labor opposition. But as we

he had acted against the advice of the then-heads of both the Mossad and military intelligence, the chairman of our nuclear energy commission, and of Shimon Peres, who was head of the Labor opposition. But as we neared our final, formal decision, we were forced into another delay. In the summer of 2012, an unre

e merit of being true: that Bibi was coming under pressure to shift our budgetary priorities away from defense toward social and economic issues. But Panetta understood that my request for a delay meant we were at least considering military action. He also realized that if we did launch an attack, it was i

HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028268 / BARAK / 135 Yet especially with my main points of contact in the administration - first Bob Gates and then his successor, Leon Panetta, as Secretary of Defense - our broadly shared views, mutual respect, and the strength of the US-Israeli alliance outweighed any of that. Neither they

n significant numbers of US troops would begin arriving. As we weighed our final decision, I held a series of high-level meetings in Washington: with Panetta, national security adviser Tom Donilon, Hillary Clinton, and President Obama himself. Though not explicitly saying we were ready to attack, I left no

. There are many examples of this, such as the when the Egyptian president exchanged messages of congratulations and thanks with Israeli president Shimon Peres, or regarding the content of the president's meetings and phone calls with Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. There was an announcement that Preside

lations and thanks with Israeli president Shimon Peres, or regarding the content of the president's meet

contributed to a warning last week from Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta that the United States was at risk of a "cyber-Pearl Harbor." After Mr. Panetta's remarks on Thursday night, American officials described an emerging shadow war of attacks and counterattacks already under way between the United

erman failed to boost his popularity in the polls as he'd expected. This is not the first time the Israelis have launched a war for electoral gain. Shimon Peres did it to Lebanon in 1996 and the Olmert-Livni-Barak alliance did it to Gaza in 2008. What is important here is the immoral and short- sighted stan

s have launched a war for electoral gain. Shimon Peres did it to Lebanon in 1996 and the Olmert-Livni-B

oop presence in Afghanistan concludes in 2014. But the scaling down there and in Iraq has already freed up resources to go east. Earlier this year, Leon Panetta, the Pentagon chief, said the US would deploy 60 per cent of its naval assets in the Asia-Pacificand 40 per cent in the Atlantic — from the previou

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