Epstein Secrets

ngs on whom America depended to help protect its interests. They were constant, if not always agreeable, companions. Egypt's Mubarak, Jordan's King Hussein, Tunisia's Ben Ali, Yemen's Ali Saleh, Morocco's King Hassan II, Saudi Arabia's kings Fand and Abdullah. The PLO's Yasir Arafat rounded out the gr

ghts abuses, authoritarian behavior, and faux reforms. Then there were the adversarial authoritarians. Here, a smaller group photo featured Iraq's Saddam Hussein, Syria's Assads (father and son), and Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi. America sought to check and constrain their power, even removing one through inva

nstrain their power, even removing one through invasion. But at times, the United States found common ground with them too. (See: cooperation with Saddam against the Iranian mullahs, and dancing with Assad on the peace process.) As pure and unadulterated dictators, however, they were incorrigible, be

ou. We became pretty chummy with all these guys. Traveling with secretaries of state, we always went to Cairo first to consult with our good friend Hosni. Successive CIA station chiefs had very close personal relationships with the king of Jordan. There was little need to delve deeper, and it was a r

onomic sanctions have "kicked in" strongly enough to produce the desired result—until now. Sanctions against the regimes led by Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein and Bashar al-Assad produced scarcity and hardship for the poorest of their citizens but enriched the leadership circle, who exacted higher rents o

s against the regimes led by Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein and Bashar al-Assad produced scarcity and

st the regimes led by Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein and Bashar al-Assad produced scarcity and hardsh

main uncertain. Do you think part of the kingdom's anger with the United States went back to 2011, when the U.S. allowed former Egyptian president [Hosni] Mubarak to be ousted so quickly? I think there was some disappointment that the United States did not stand by someone who for 30 years was a ver

ions of = military strike are not widely discussed. This ominously echoes the run up to the war in Iraq.ap> When Washington was preparing t= invade Saddam Hussein's Iraq, little consideration was given to what ca=e next. Ten years later, the mistakes are evident. Iraq did not pose the immediate security threat t

Iraq.ap> When Washington was preparing t= invade Saddam Hussein's Iraq, little consideration was given to

> When Washington was preparing t= invade Saddam Hussein's Iraq, little consideration was given to what ca

raim Halevy 7 EFTA_R1_001 07020 EFTA01785158 May 10, 2013 -- In October 1995= Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin telephoned Egyptian President Hosni =ubarak to inform him that peace was at hand between Israel and Syria. Two weeks later, Rabin was dead, killed by a rea=tionary Jewish Israeli fana

much differently than did American and European policymakers. The Gulf monarchies were shocked that the United States "abandoned" Egyptian President Hosni HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029717 --- PAGE BREAK --- Mubarak in his time of need in early 2011. Their leaders expected the United States to push for Mubarak a

990. When faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear we

en faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear weapons to

. One of the great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the Middle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hussein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up forces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam

much differently than did American and European policymakers. The Gulf monarchies were shocked that the United States "abandoned" Egyptian President Hosni HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029804 --- PAGE BREAK --- Mubarak in his time of need in early 2011. Their leaders expected the United States to push for Mubarak a

990. When faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear we

en faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear weapons to

. One of the great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the Middle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hussein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up forces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam