Epstein Secrets

not based on anyone's consent but on coercion and domestic terror. The governing 12 percent minority of the Alawite sect is Syria's equivalent to Saddam Hussein's clan of Tikriti Sunnis, both having ruled cruelly and bloodily. Indeed, the Assads have nursed a particular grudge against the Palestinians, almost

ity of the Alawite sect is Syria's equivalent to Saddam Hussein's clan of Tikriti Sunnis, both having ru

the Alawite sect is Syria's equivalent to Saddam Hussein's clan of Tikriti Sunnis, both having ruled crue

am glad we have a president who sees America that way. That argument cannot just be shrugged off, especially when confronting a dictator like Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. But, at the same time, I believe that it is naïve to think that we can be humanitarians only from the air — and now we just hand the situation off

qi exiles who told President George W. Bush that divisions among country's Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish communities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberately downplayed the salience of these ethno-sectarian identities. Moreover, reassuring statements made to Wes

h communities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberate

nities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberately downp

not blocking the no-fly zone over Libya, but he feels burned by it — that we went from protecting civilians to toppling his ally and arms customer, Muammar el-Qaddafi. It's true. But what an ally! What a thing to regret! And, now, the more Putin throws his support behind the murderous dictatorship of Bashar al-As

gotry, that old "Arab street" — farewell to it, once and for all — had nothing to say about the terror inflicted on Shiites and Kurds in Iraq, for Saddam Hussein was beloved by the crowds, a pan-Arab hero, an enforcer of Sunni interests. Nor did many Arabs take notice in 1978 when Imam Musa al-Sadr, the lead

rror inflicted on Shiites and Kurds in Iraq, for Saddam Hussein was beloved by the crowds, a pan-Arab her

flicted on Shiites and Kurds in Iraq, for Saddam Hussein was beloved by the crowds, a pan-Arab hero, an e

s, retreating into the privacy of their homes. In the public space, there was now the cult of the rulers, the unbounded power of Saddam Hussein and Muammar el-Qaddafi and Hafez al-Assad in Syria and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. The traditional restraints on power had been swept away, and no new social con

quickly loses its appeal when one is dealing with dictators who are less noxious. And even when they are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still fraught with difficulty since the worse the autocrat, the worse the chaos left in his wake. That is

y are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is

ot less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still f

for nondemocratic regimes are always preferable to hard ones, even if the process takes some time. A moral argument can be made that monsters like Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya and Kim Jong-il in North Korea should be overthrown any way they can, as fast as we can, regardless of the risk of short-term chaos. But t

i exiles who told President George W. Bush that divisions among country's Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish communities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberately downplayed the salience of these ethno-sectarian identities. Moreover, reassuring statements made to We

h communities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberate

nities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberately downp

Libya, but he feels burned by EFTA_R1_00228265 EFTA01841729 it — that we went from protecting civilians to toppling his ally and arms customer, Muammar el-Qaddafi. It's true. But what an ally! What a thing to regret! And, now, the more Putin throws his support behind the murderous dictatorship of Bashar al- A

eon E. Panetta telephoned Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, head of Egypt's ruling military council,

foreign policy will be an advantage for him, particularly because of his record of pulling troops out of Iraq, helping topple the government of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya, taking robust action against terrorists and authorizing the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. He is the "first real national security De

Association notes that, "Even after crushing Iraq in the first Gulf War, the international coalition only imposed a 150-kilometer range ceiling on Saddam's ballistic missiles. A demand to eliminate all ballistic missiles would be unprecedented in the modern era-- removing any doubt among Iranians that

ed turmoil after the successful uprising there, Syria's opposition appears scattered. Well before NATO intervened in Libya, groups hostile to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi leveraged the huge chunk of eastern Libya they held around Benghazi into the attempt to claim the whole country. A unified focus on the rebellion s