Epstein Secrets

's top spy agency, the ghosts of Ir .q are never far away. EFTA00656344 One C.I.A. analyst who had helped develop some of the intelligence about Saddam Hussein's supposed weapons of mass destruction had a breakdown months after the Iraq war began; he had participated in the post-invasion hunt there that foun

ad helped develop some of the intelligence about Saddam Hussein's supposed weapons of mass destruction ha

ss," the Brotherhood's Secretary General Mahmoud Hussein said during the conference explaining the reason

iro's already wildly careening political scene. • happy to admit that Iwas taken by surprise. What was the Brotherhood thinking? The nomination of Shater seems to have been a response to threats and opportunities a rapidly changing political arena, rather than the hatching of a long-term plan. But ma

The ultraconservative Al-Nour Party is yet to announce its candidate of choice. Researcher of Islamic movements Abdel-Reheem Ali told DNE that Al- Shater's nomination will only affect the Islamist vote as liberals, leftists, and the revolutionary youth will never vote for him. "Al-Shater's candidacy

s the President of Egypt? I've been studying Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood for many years, and have interviewed most of its senior leaders (including Shater) multiple times. And I'll admit that I was surprised. So were most other MB-watchers I follow. That's in large part because it contradicts what I h

ngs on whom America depended to help protect its interests. They were constant, if not always agreeable, companions. Egypt's Mubarak, Jordan's King Hussein, Tunisia's Ben Ali, Yemen's Ali Saleh, Morocco's King Hassan II, Saudi Arabia's kings Fand and Abdullah. The PLO's Yasir Arafat rounded out the gr

ghts abuses, authoritarian behavior, and faux reforms. Then there were the adversarial authoritarians. Here, a smaller group photo featured Iraq's Saddam Hussein, Syria's Assads (father and son), and Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi. America sought to check and constrain their power, even removing one through inva

nstrain their power, even removing one through invasion. But at times, the United States found common ground with them too. (See: cooperation with Saddam against the Iranian mullahs, and dancing with Assad on the peace process.) As pure and unadulterated dictators, however, they were incorrigible, be

"Egyptian renaissance," which they joyfully unfurled on cue. Meanwhile, senior officials at the head table drank from coffee mugs emblazoned with Shater's rather imposing headshot. Shater's last name means "clever" in Arabic -- a fitting moniker for the self-made millionaire -- and one handmade sign

ict of Shubra al-Kheima, a Brotherhood stronghold, to hear what their candidate would do upon capturing the Egyptian presidency. The rally, one of Shater's first since announcing his candidacy, managed to be both tightly organized and raucous -- Muslim Brotherhood cadres of all ages drowned out the n

cts until Ankara signed a water agreement with the states below it. The United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003 changed all that. The toppling of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent empowerment of Iraqi Shias instilled a fear in the kingdom that Saudi's own Shia population would agitate for change. Beyond th

f Iraq in 2003 changed all that. The toppling of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent empowerment of Iraqi

in 2003 changed all that. The toppling of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent empowerment of Iraqi Shias in

on commission disqualified many of the top candidates who had announced their intentions to run and the Brotherhood had been given the tip that el- Shater would be considered a definite reject. In a surprise shift, the more ideologically strict Salafists countered with the comparatively moderate Abdel

e prominent Alawite sheikhs, Mohib Nisafi, Yassin Hussein, and Mussa Mansour, issued a joint statement [2]

s would seem rather long if one is to judge by the views of the Brotherhood's recently-named candidate to be president of Egypt, Khairat al Shater. Shater was, until his nomination, the deputy head of the Brotherhood and as such its chief operating officer. Among his responsibilities was the direction

lamic state which had endured for a 1000 years. Brotherhood organization and discipline had followed this model. But what of the "variables" which Shater did admit existed? Were there new circumstances which might require new methods and policies in pursuit of "Brotherhood work'?" Indeed there were a