Epstein Secrets

the Tuwaitha complex in Iraq. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon saw the reactor as central to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's quest to build nuclear weapons, and they believed that it posed an existential threat to Israel. The timing of the strike was justified by intelli

nts and warnings of military action. For Israelis considering a strike on Iran, Osirak seems like a model for effective preventive war. After all, Hussein never got the bomb, and if Israel was able to brush back one enemy hell-bent on its destruction, it can do so again. But a closer look at the Osira

on saw the reactor as central to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's quest to build nuclear weapons, and th

l March 2 -- On June 7, 1981, eight Israeli F-16 fighter jets, protected by six F-15 escorts, dropped 16 2,000-pound bombs on the nearly completed Osirak nuclear reactor at the Tuwaitha complex in Iraq. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon saw the reactor as central

the Tuwaitha complex in Iraq. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Arid Sharon saw the reactor as central to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's quest to build nuclear weapons, and they believed that it posed an existential threat to Israel. The timing of the strike was justified by intellig

ents and warnings of military action. For Israelis considering a strike on Iran, Osirak seems like a model for effective preventive war. After all, Hussein never got the bomb, and if Israel was able to brush back one enemy hell- bent on its destruction, it can do so again. But a closer look at the Osir

on saw the reactor as central to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's quest to build nuclear weapons, and th

March 2 -- On June 7, 1981, eight Israeli F-16 fighter jets, protected by six F-15 escorts, dropped 16 2,000-pound bombs on the nearly completed Osirak nuclear reactor at the Tuwaitha complex in Iraq. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Arid Sharon saw the reactor as central

fer that was very favorable to the West. The time was mid-2003, a point at which the United States showed its military might by easily disposing of Saddam's army in weeks, and with few casualties-a feat Iran could not accomplish after fighting him for eight years. The fact that the Bush administration

ld that had acquired a perverse kind of stability. The status quo was hardly perfect, but it was, particularly after the Iraq war and the demise of Saddam Hussein, relatively manageable for the Arabs and the West. Now all of that is gone. Within a year -- a stunningly inconsequential unit of time in the grand

arly after the Iraq war and the demise of Saddam Hussein, relatively manageable for the Arabs and the West

to Strike Iran Amos Yadlin February 29, 2012 -- ON July 7, 1981, I was one of eight Israeli fighter pilots who bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak. As we sat in the briefing room listening to the army chief of staff, Rafael Eitan, before starting our planes' engines, I recalled a conversation

AIRPOWER By Martin van Creveld Illustrated. 498 pp. PublicAffairs. $35. April 22, 2011 -- When President George W. Bush launched his war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq with an incandescent burst of "shock and awe," political commentators marveled at the seemingly magical impact of modern air power. Some forec

resident George W. Bush launched his war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq with an incandescent burst of "sho

t George W. Bush launched his war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq with an incandescent burst of "shock and

and Syria that gravely jeopardized the Jewish state; the 1976 hostage rescue at Entebbe, Uganda; the 1981 raid against Iraqi nuclear facilities at Osirak; and the similar raid against Syria in 2007. Van Creveld traces aerial fighting machines back to 18th-century ballooning and to the Wright brother