Epstein Secrets

led dictatorship that was held together by an iron fist under Baathist ideology. And, for me, the lesson of Iraq is quite simple: You can't go from Saddam to Switzerland without getting stuck in Hobbes — a war of all against all — unless you have a well- armed external midwife, whom everyone on the gro

edded in President George W. Bush's administration were determined to reshape the region in Israel's and America's interest. Their first target was Saddam Hussein's Iraq, seen as a potential threat to Israel. Had the United States been successful in Iraq, Syria would have been next. Neither Iraq nor the United

America's interest. Their first target was Saddam Hussein's Iraq, seen as a potential threat to Israel. Ha

Hizballah, which dared challenge the regional dominance of Israel and the United States. Syria had a narrow escape in 2003-4. Led by the Pentagon's Paul Wolfowitz, the pro-Israeli neo-cons embedded in President George W. Bush's administration were determined to reshape the region in Israel's and America's in

t money spent on security or lost to waste and fraud, it said. Former President George W. Bush's administration cited its belief that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's government held weapons of mass destruction to justify the decision to go to war. U.S. and allied forces later found that such stockpiles did not

ere were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Saddam Hussein had no links to al Qaeda. The U.S. was gr

e no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Saddam Hussein had no links to al Qaeda. The U.S. was greeted no

Office of Management and Budget of $5o to $6o billion when a number of officials, including former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz suggested the war could be done on the cheap and that it would largely pay for itself. In October 2003, Rumsfeld told a press conference about Pres

ld," said President Bush. So much for accountability. Then, of course, there was Vice President Cheney: "We do know, with absolute certainty, that (Saddam Hussein] is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon." -- "No. I think we may wel

s liberators, and that will help us to keep requirements down ... It's hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post- Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army. Hard to imagine. And the bi

e do know, with absolute certainty, that (Saddam Hussein] is using his procurement system to acquire the e

pation of a country as large as Iraq would require a force of "several hundred thousand soldiers." Two days later, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz indirectly called Shinseki's analysis "outlandish" to a House committee. He continued: I would expect that even countries like France will have a st

Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, did not even exist. All of this changed in 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and President George H. W. Bush dispatched 700,000 troops to expel him and defend Saudi Arabia. After the war was won, thousands sta

t, and President George H. W. Bush dispatched 700,000 troops to expel him and defend Saudi Arabia. After the war was won, thousands stayed to deter Saddam, and to enforce no-fly zones over Iraq. Before the Gulf War, the Saudi native Osama bin Laden and his associates had focused on supporting the Muja

exist. All of this changed in 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and President George H. W. Bush

roops entered Saudi Arabia. Key advisers to George W. Bush recognized this. After U.S. forces overthrew Saddam in 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said one of the benefits "that has gone by almost unnoticed — but it's huge — is that by complete mutual agreement between the U.S. and the Saudi go

n exist. All of this changed in 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and President George H. W. Bush

Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, did not even exist. All of this changed in 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and President George H. W. Bush dispatched 700,000 troops to expel him and defend Saudi Arabia. After the war was won, thousands st

t, and President George H. W. Bush dispatched 700,000 troops to expel him and defend Saudi Arabia. After the war was won, thousands stayed to deter Saddam, and to enforce no-fly zones over Iraq. Before the Gulf War, the Saudi native Osama bin Laden and his associates had focused on supporting the Muja

roops entered Saudi Arabia. Key advisers to George W. Bush recognized this. After U.S. forces overthrew Saddam in 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said one of the benefits "that has gone by almost unnoticed—but EFTA00834935 it's huge—is that by complete mutual agreement between the U.S. and t

We do know, with absolute certainty, that [Saddam Hussein] is using his procurement system to acquire the

ld," said President Bush. So much for accountability. Then, of course, there was Vice President Cheney: "We do know, with absolute certainty, that [Saddam Hussein] is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon." Or this one, from 2005 --

that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army. Hard to imagine. Actually, not so hard, given that Shinseki had just imagined it. And that's one of the most madden

pation of a country as large as Iraq would require a force of "several hundred thousand soldiers." Two days later, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz indirectly called Shinseki's analysis "outlandish" to a House committee. He continued: I would expect that even countries like France will have a s