Epstein Secrets

They recognized that no one would believe that United Nations forces in Korea would be so barbaric as to resort to such weapons. In 1987 and 1988, Saddam Hussein launched attacks on no fewer than 40 Kurdish villages in northern Iraq, using new mixtures of mustard gas and various nerve agents such as Sarin,

as to resort to such weapons. In 1987 and 1988, Saddam Hussein launched attacks on no fewer than 40 Kur

resort to such weapons. In 1987 and 1988, Saddam Hussein launched attacks on no fewer than 40 Kurdish vil

ing democracy; the so- called Deauville Partnership never got much beyond the stage of rhetoric. I'm told a more ambitious proposal for a concerted Arab Spring initiative was debated within the Obama administration in 2012 but was rejected because it might have been a distraction from President Obama's all

olitical reconciliation and economic growth. There was a halfhearted effort led by France in 2011 to create a sort of collective support system for Arab Spring democracy; the so- called Deauville Partnership never got much beyond the stage of rhetoric. I'm told a more ambitious proposal for a concerted Ara

make a country's transformation self-sustaining, unless the people themselves want to take charge of the process. In Iraq, George W. Bush removed Saddam Hussein, who had EFTA_R1_00441189 EFTA01964441 been governing that country vertically, from the top-down, with an iron fist. Bush tried to create the co

of the process. In Iraq, George W. Bush removed Saddam Hussein, who had EFTA_R1_00441189 EFTA01964441

process. In Iraq, George W. Bush removed Saddam Hussein, who had EFTA_R1_00441189 EFTA01964441 been g

py about the current state of affairs. U.S. credibility and its image in the Middle East have taken a real beating. And our policy on the so-called Arab Spring, or what's left of it, is pretty much at sea, largely because we can't shape the internal dynamics of these societies. Still, on many things that

i exiles who told President George W. Bush that divisions among country's Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish communities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberately downplayed the salience of these ethno-sectarian identities. Moreover, reassuring statements made to We

h communities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberate

nities could be easily overcome in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq either underestimated or deliberately downp

omes violence, and at best, will result in continuation of the revolution. In this way, one year after the Egyptian revolution, and the so- called Arab Spring, the state of affairs have changed in an unprecedented manner which is not likely to reoccur in the future. What we came to know is that the early

today it is particularly problematic, because this is a critical juncture. Every one of these awakening countries needs to make the transition from Saddam to Jefferson without getting stuck in Khomeini. Why has the Arab awakening produced so few new leaders? Partly because the electoral process is st

on has taken. Said Sadek, a political sociologist who participated in the protests that brought down Mubarak last year, says in retrospect, Egypt's Arab Spring was "a mix of a popular revolution and a military coup." "Egypt is in the surgery room at the moment, and in surgery you see ugly things," said Sa