Epstein Secrets

ngs on whom America depended to help protect its interests. They were constant, if not always agreeable, companions. Egypt's Mubarak, Jordan's King Hussein, Tunisia's Ben Ali, Yemen's Ali Saleh, Morocco's King Hassan II, Saudi Arabia's kings Fand and Abdullah. The PLO's Yasir Arafat rounded out the gr

ghts abuses, authoritarian behavior, and faux reforms. Then there were the adversarial authoritarians. Here, a smaller group photo featured Iraq's Saddam Hussein, Syria's Assads (father and son), and Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi. America sought to check and constrain their power, even removing one through inva

nstrain their power, even removing one through invasion. But at times, the United States found common ground with them too. (See: cooperation with Saddam against the Iranian mullahs, and dancing with Assad on the peace process.) As pure and unadulterated dictators, however, they were incorrigible, be

s a very traditional society. In a country of 85 million, you have to wonder how much of it the Facebook kids, the secularists, and the liberals of Tahrir Square actually represented. The future of the 100-member constituent assembly charged with drafting the all-important constitution is now uncerta

other without having to turn to the mutual defense clause. These options should be considered now. For example, before the US-led coalition invaded Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003, Turkey requested a meeting with its allies, under Article 4 of the NATO treaty, to discuss how the alliance could help Turkey deter a

k. During the 1991 Gulf War, then Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had millions of barrels of oil dumped int

mous among them includes Mohamed Hassan, Mohamed Hussein Yacoub, Abu Ishaq El-Howaini, Sayed El- Afani, Os

lar despot, uniformed or not? The events Friday were troubling. The Brotherhood has a hard time accepting dissent. Its avowed reason for occupying Tahrir — the acquittal last week of Mubarak-era officials accused of involvement in the deadly camel charge on protesters in the square last year — looked

of the last U.S. troops from Iraq, we're finally going to get the answer to the core question about that country: Was Iraq the way Iraq was because Saddam was the way Saddam was, or was Saddam the way Saddam was because Iraq is the way Iraq is — a collection of sects and tribes unable to live togethe

s been a mounting campaign by the prime minister, a Shiite with close ties to Iran, against perceived Sunni enemies. Hundreds of former members of Saddam Hussein's Baath party have been arrested in recent weeks. EFTA_R1_01992712 EFTA02681497 14 Security forces controlled by Mr. Maliki have surrounded the c

ternal iron fist that held Iraq together (Saddam Hussein) and the external iron fist (the U.S. armed force

unity, and equal rights for all. For eighteen days last winter, that model for a new and democratic Egypt seemed plausible; it was being lived in Tahrir. Copts and Muslims, women and men, youth and the elderly, secular and religious protested and prayed together and shared tents and meals. The Copts

quickly loses its appeal when one is dealing with dictators who are less noxious. And even when they are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still fraught with difficulty since the worse the autocrat, the worse the chaos left in his wake. That is

y are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is

ot less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still f

ose of Rome, but they both indicate a very difficult truth central to the outcome of the Arab Spring: it is not about the expressions of freedom in Tahrir Square so much as it is about the building of legitimate institutions to replace illegitimate ones. And because institutions are hierarchical— and

q War. Then, the primary concern was that Saddam Hussein's regime would use weapons against another count

ia if the opportunity arose. This threat is not analogous to concerns expressed in the run-up to the Iraq War. Then, the primary concern was that Saddam Hussein's regime would use weapons against another country or deliberately transfer them to a terrorist group. Further, it was suspected that Iraq might hav

the Iraq War. Then, the primary concern was that Saddam Hussein's regime would use weapons against anoth

ings. What does our reaction say about us?" They need to have that conversation. In Egypt, every day it becomes clearer that the Army has used the Tahrir uprising to get rid of its main long- term rival for succession — President Hosni Mubarak's more reform-minded son, Gamal. Now, having gotten rid o

ing this was the best the Arabs could do. In a sudden burst of Wilsonianism in Iraq and after, the United States had put its power behind liberty. Saddam Hussein was flushed out of a spider hole, the Syrian brigades of terror and extortion were pushed out of Lebanon, and the despotism of Hosni Mubarak, long

United States had put its power behind liberty. Saddam Hussein was flushed out of a spider hole, the Sy

States had put its power behind liberty. Saddam Hussein was flushed out of a spider hole, the Syrian bri

us man, but his reign had sprouted dynastic ambitions. For 18 magical days in January and February, Egyptians of all walks of life came together in Tahrir Square demanding to be rid of him. The senior commanders of the armed forces cast him aside, and he joined his fellow despot, Tunisia's Zine el-Ab

ria if the opportunity arose. This threat is not analogous to concerns expressed in the run-up to the Iraq War. Then, the primary concern was that Saddam Hussein's regime would use weapons against another country or deliberately transfer them to a terrorist group. Further, it was suspected that Iraq might have

the Iraq War. Then, the primary concern was that Saddam Hussein's regime would use weapons against anoth

aq War. Then, the primary concern was that Saddam Hussein's regime would use weapons against another count

lings. What does our reaction say about us?" They need to have that conversation. In Egypt, every day it becomes clearer that the Army has used the Tahrir uprising to get rid of its main long-term rival for succession — President Hosni Mubarak's more reform-minded son, Gamal. Now, having gotten rid o

fraid. In 1989, Americans gloated as the Soviet Union, our former rival for Middle Eastern supremacy, retreated ignominiously from the region. When Saddam Hussein tried to challenge us from within, we thrashed him in the Gulf War. Throughout the 1990s, we sent our economists, law professors and investment ba

red. Lines were being drawn—between Arabs and Persians, between Sunnis and Shiites. EFTA00586649 18 A decent man tried to broker this feud, King Hussein of Jordan, himself a Sunni claiming descent from the prophet. He wrote to Gadhafi: These are "sensitive times," he said, for Palestinians and Leba

y, retreated ignominiously from the region. When Saddam Hussein tried to challenge us from within, we th

EFTA00586640 9 resolution. If the Arab Spring has done nothing else, it has at least disposed of the latter proposition. From Tehran to Tunis to Tahrir Square, Muslims are rising against their rulers for reasons quite apart from anything happening in Gaza, the West Bank or the Golan Heights. This

an has often been singled out as the main beneficiary of the US-led invasion of Iraq, as well as the biggest threat to Iraq's stability in the post- Saddam era. Iran's uninterrupted support for Shia militia groups in southern Iraq, particularly the Mandi army, is seen as one indication of its involveme

nd at the polls in recent months, the modification is mainly less moderate, not more. For example, the Brotherhood belatedly joined the protests in Tahrir Square, but after Mubarak fell, its leaders opposed any "supraconstitutional" guarantees of individual freedoms and then barred members from furth

eon E. Panetta telephoned Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, head of Egypt's ruling military council,

transition followed by military rule, leading to a second wave of popular protest that leads to a period of chaos. As the episodes appeared in the Tahrir newspaper, many readers anxiously asked whether there was an "exit" from this long and dark tunnel. There is, at least in the novel, but it took ni