Epstein Secrets

he fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, America aimed at a "new world order." There was to be no place, at least in theory, for renegade dictators like Saddam Hussein or Slobodan Milosevic. After 9/11, the U.S. declared a "war on terror" and led an international effort to stop Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and Islam

at least in theory, for renegade dictators like Saddam Hussein or Slobodan Milosevic. After 9/11, the U

st in theory, for renegade dictators like Saddam Hussein or Slobodan Milosevic. After 9/11, the U.S. decl

, which consists of many facilities, widely dispersed and well protected. The most critical one, nestled deep underground within a mountain, is the Fordow site, and its -three thousand-plus centrifuges have enabled Iran to spin out enriched uranium from uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) to a level of 19.

the Tuwaitha complex in Iraq. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon saw the reactor as central to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's quest to build nuclear weapons, and they believed that it posed an existential threat to Israel. The timing of the strike was justified by intelli

nts and warnings of military action. For Israelis considering a strike on Iran, Osirak seems like a model for effective preventive war. After all, Hussein never got the bomb, and if Israel was able to brush back one enemy hell-bent on its destruction, it can do so again. But a closer look at the Osira

on saw the reactor as central to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's quest to build nuclear weapons, and th

would then have to circumvent Iranian air defenses and drop hundreds of precision-guided munitions on the hardened Natanz enrichment facility, the Fordow enrichment site deep in a mountain near Q(n, the Isfahan uranium-conversion facility, the heavy-water production plant and plutonium reactor under

the Tuwaitha complex in Iraq. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Arid Sharon saw the reactor as central to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's quest to build nuclear weapons, and they believed that it posed an existential threat to Israel. The timing of the strike was justified by intellig

ents and warnings of military action. For Israelis considering a strike on Iran, Osirak seems like a model for effective preventive war. After all, Hussein never got the bomb, and if Israel was able to brush back one enemy hell- bent on its destruction, it can do so again. But a closer look at the Osir

on saw the reactor as central to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's quest to build nuclear weapons, and th

would then have to circumvent Iranian air defenses and drop hundreds of precision-guided munitions on the hardened Natanz enrichment facility, the Fordow enrichment site deep in a mountain near Qom, the Isfahan uranium- conversion facility, the heavy-water production plant and plutonium reactor under

owever, is not only to legitimate Iran's quest for nuclear weapons but also accelerate it. That's precisely what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Israelis know that, too. 3. Let America do it What the Israelis really want is to persuade the United States t

precisely what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Isr

ly what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Israelis kn

tiated outcome is far more desirable, and then state that any acceptable negotiated deal must require immediate closing the underground facility at Fordow, freezing of all enrichment above five percent and exporting of all of Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched above that level, and imposing intrusiv

however, is not only to legitimate Iran's quest for nuclear weapons but also accelerate it. That's precisely what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Israelis know that, too. 3. Let America do it What the Israelis really want is to persuade the United States t

precisely what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Is

ly what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Israelis kn

tiated outcome is far more desirable, and then state that any acceptable negotiated deal must require immediate closing the underground facility at Fordow, freezing of all enrichment above five percent and exporting of all of Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched above that level, and imposing intrusi

an has often been singled out as the main beneficiary of the US-led invasion of Iraq, as well as the biggest threat to Iraq's stability in the post- Saddam era. Iran's uninterrupted support for Shia militia groups in southern Iraq, particularly the Mandi army, is seen as one indication of its involveme

senior U.S. official who is an expert on Iran. The official said some Pentagon war planners believe conventional bombs won't be effective against Fordow and that a tactical nuclear weapon may be the only military option if the goal is to destroy the facility. "Once things go into the mountain, then