Epstein Secrets

oval, making inroads into the Levant and their goal of "exporting the Islamic revolution" would not succeed. No doubt that Arafat's close ties with Saddam Hussein, a nemesis of both Assad and Khomeini, and his concession to recognize Israel also widened the chasm between the PLO and the Islamic Republic. From

succeed. No doubt that Arafat's close ties with Saddam Hussein, a nemesis of both Assad and Khomeini, a

d. No doubt that Arafat's close ties with Saddam Hussein, a nemesis of both Assad and Khomeini, and his c

supporting Hamas is linked to its alliance with President Assad. In other words, despite the Iranian commitment to the Palestinian resistance, the Islamic Republic saw its relationship with the Palestinian as well as the EFTA00630297 Lebanese resistance from a Syrian perspective. This is well understood in t

ria if the opportunity arose. This threat is not analogous to concerns expressed in the run-up to the Iraq War. Then, the primary concern was that Saddam Hussein's regime would use weapons against another country or deliberately transfer them to a terrorist group. Further, it was suspected that Iraq might have

the Iraq War. Then, the primary concern was that Saddam Hussein's regime would use weapons against anoth

aq War. Then, the primary concern was that Saddam Hussein's regime would use weapons against another count

l's aversion to Hamas. (Nor do they share Washington's strategy of isolating and pressuring Iran, even if they're in political competition with the Islamic Republic throughout the region.) Qatar has already stepped over the wreckage of the U.S.-Israeli effort to smash Hamas and brokered a unity agreement betwe

act. Was the dream of nuclear second-strike capability lost? By no means. In January 1991, the US air force attacked Iraq, and then Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein reacted by firing modified Scud missiles at Tel Aviv and EFTA00712606 Haifa. The bombardment lasted almost six weeks. Gas masks, some of which ca

air force attacked Iraq, and then Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein reacted by firing modified Scud missiles

ce attacked Iraq, and then Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein reacted by firing modified Scud missiles at Tel A

ing that their adversary would have to think hard before striking back. That is where Syria comes in. It is the strategic relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Assad regime that makes it possible for Iran to EFTA00712619 undermine Israel's security. Over the three decades of hostility between Ira

bama completely missed the revolutionary wave of Middle Eastern democracy—precisely the wave the neocons had hoped to trigger with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. When revolution broke out—first in Iran, then in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria—the president faced stark alternatives. He could try to

eocons had hoped to trigger with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. When revolution broke out—first

trol the SCAF — he sacked Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi; military chief of staff Sami Anan; and t

n interests. Or he could do nothing and let the forces of reaction prevail. EFTA00712966 In the case of Iran he did nothing, and the thugs of the Islamic Republic ruthlessly crushed the demonstrations. Ditto Syria. In Libya he was cajoled into intervening. In Egypt he tried to have it both ways, exhorting Egy