Epstein Secrets

ngs on whom America depended to help protect its interests. They were constant, if not always agreeable, companions. Egypt's Mubarak, Jordan's King Hussein, Tunisia's Ben Ali, Yemen's Ali Saleh, Morocco's King Hassan II, Saudi Arabia's kings Fand and Abdullah. The PLO's Yasir Arafat rounded out the gr

ghts abuses, authoritarian behavior, and faux reforms. Then there were the adversarial authoritarians. Here, a smaller group photo featured Iraq's Saddam Hussein, Syria's Assads (father and son), and Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi. America sought to check and constrain their power, even removing one through inva

nstrain their power, even removing one through invasion. But at times, the United States found common ground with them too. (See: cooperation with Saddam against the Iranian mullahs, and dancing with Assad on the peace process.) As pure and unadulterated dictators, however, they were incorrigible, be

as rule has not turned out as many expected Karin Brulliard Article 2. Foreign Policy Middle East diplomacy is a lot trickier without dictators Aaron David Miller Article 3. Foreign Policy Can the Brotherhood Win In Egypt Without Its No. 1 Star? Ashraf Khalil Article 4. Los Angeles Times Egypt's looming

make a country's transformation self-sustaining, unless the people themselves want to take charge of the process. In Iraq, George W. Bush removed Saddam Hussein, who had EFTA_R1_00441189 EFTA01964441 been governing that country vertically, from the top-down, with an iron fist. Bush tried to create the co

of the process. In Iraq, George W. Bush removed Saddam Hussein, who had EFTA_R1_00441189 EFTA01964441

process. In Iraq, George W. Bush removed Saddam Hussein, who had EFTA_R1_00441189 EFTA01964441 been g

rticle 3. NYT Foreign Policy by Whisper and Nudge Thomas L. Friedman Article 4. Los Angeles Times A report card for U.S. policy in the Mideast Aaron David Miller Amcle 5 NYT Pressure Rises on Hamas as Patrons' Support Fades Jodi Rudoren Article 6. The New York Times In Syria, America Loses if Either Sid

fer that was very favorable to the West. The time was mid-2003, a point at which the United States showed its military might by easily disposing of Saddam's army in weeks, and with few casualties-a feat Iran could not accomplish after fighting him for eight years. The fact that the Bush administration

ld that had acquired a perverse kind of stability. The status quo was hardly perfect, but it was, particularly after the Iraq war and the demise of Saddam Hussein, relatively manageable for the Arabs and the West. Now all of that is gone. Within a year -- a stunningly inconsequential unit of time in the grand

arly after the Iraq war and the demise of Saddam Hussein, relatively manageable for the Arabs and the West

st North Korea nuclear-food aid deal Allen McDuffee Article 5 Los Angeles Times EFTA_R1_00229369 EFTA01842470 Welcome to the new Middle East Aaron David Miller Article 6. Article I. NYT The Economist Why trade reform matters in the Middle East Israel's Last Chance to Strike Iran Amos Yadlin February

owever, is not only to legitimate Iran's quest for nuclear weapons but also accelerate it. That's precisely what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Israelis know that, too. 3. Let America do it What the Israelis really want is to persuade the United States t

precisely what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Isr

ly what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Israelis kn

rce Against Iran 2. Elliott Abrams Article Foreign Policy Everyone calm down: Israel is not going to bomb 3. Iran. Well, at least not in 2012 Aaron David Miller Article AL-MONITOR Eight Islamic Sects Meet in Saudi, But Can They 4. Make Amends Sleiman Takieddine Article The Daily Star Ethics matter, t

however, is not only to legitimate Iran's quest for nuclear weapons but also accelerate it. That's precisely what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Israelis know that, too. 3. Let America do it What the Israelis really want is to persuade the United States t

precisely what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Is

ly what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Israelis kn

nst Article 2. Iran Elliott Abrams Foreign Policy Everyone calm down: Israel is not going Article 3. to bomb Iran. Well, at least not in 2012 Aaron David Miller AL-MONITOR Eight Islamic Sects Meet in Saudi, But Article 4. Can They Make Amends Sleiman Takieddine EFTA_R1_02211644 EFTA02724638 Article 5

zen of the world." For all these reasons, Barack Hussein Obama has — by virtue of his identity, his biogra

r 20 update 20 November, 2012 Article 1. The New Republic The Long Road to a Moderate Hamas Nathan Brown Foreign Policy How Hamas Won the War Aaron David Miller Article 3 New York Daily News The Fuel for The Flames Dennis Ross Article 4. Article 5. Stratfor Israel and Gaza: Then and Now The Washingto

it will be the president traveling to Israel to ask for a new beginning." Article 2. Foreign Policy Saeb Erekat - The Peace Processor An interview by Aaron David Miller February 5, 2013 - Other than Mahmoud Abbas, Saeb Erekat could be the most recognizable Palestinian on the planet. The chief Palestinian negotiator i

990. When faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear we

en faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear weapons to

. One of the great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the Middle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hussein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up forces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam

it will be the president traveling to Israel to ask for a new beginning." Article 2. Foreign Policy Saeb Erekat - The Peace Processor An interview by Aaron David Miller February 5, 2013 - Other than Mahmoud Abbas, Saeb Erekat could be the most recognizable Palestinian on the planet. The chief Palestinian negotiator i

990. When faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear we

en faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear weapons to

. One of the great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the Middle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hussein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up forces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam