Epstein Secrets

ver for the international-Arab alliance which led Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait around 20 years ago, while

the international-Arab alliance which led Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait around 20 years ago, while prior t

Damascus. EFTA00712753 Even President Hosni Mubarak never hesitated for a second to provide a cover for the international-Arab alliance which led Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait around 20 years ago, while prior to that, he had established the Arab Cooperation Council with Baghdad, Amman and Sana'a to remain a

anks of Washington's think EFTA00712796 tank world, as the head of the foreign-policy program at the Brookings Institution. (He also founded both Brookings's Saban Center for Middle East Policy and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.) Indyk -- who k_d early U.S. efforts to get Libya's Muamm

der Strobe Talbott's leadership, the Brookings Institution has been consistently ranked Washington's most influential think tank. Talbott landed at Brookings after a long career that has included stints as both a journalist -- he was a correspondent and editor at Time magazine for decades, as well as the

e Arab world stood against Saudi Arabia and with Saddam Hussein against the U.S. military intervention.

world stood against Saudi Arabia and with Saddam Hussein against the U.S. military intervention. The Saud

that time]. But this changed during the first Gulf War, when most of the Brotherhood factions in the Arab world stood against Saudi Arabia and with Saddam Hussein against the U.S. military intervention. The Saudis have been suspicious of the Brothers since then, and with the upsurge in political activity in S

dent Obama and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was meant to quell speculation that relations between the two long- standing allies had collapsed, says Brookings fellow F Gregory Gause. But despite the assurances proffered by the Obama administration, serious differences over policy regarding Iran, Syria, an

not based on anyone's consent but on coercion and domestic terror. The governing 12 percent minority of the Alawite sect is Syria's equivalent to Saddam Hussein's clan of Tikriti Sunnis, both having ruled cruelly and bloodily. Indeed, the Assads have nursed a particular grudge against the Palestinians, almost

ity of the Alawite sect is Syria's equivalent to Saddam Hussein's clan of Tikriti Sunnis, both having ru

the Alawite sect is Syria's equivalent to Saddam Hussein's clan of Tikriti Sunnis, both having ruled crue

01 1 Article 1. Asia Times A golden opportunity for Assad Sami Moubayed NYT The Syrian President I Know David W. Lesch Article 3. Article 2. Brookings The Syrian Rift Starner Rabinovich Article 4. The New Republic Why Has the U.S. Been So Soft on Bashar Assad? Martin Peretz Article 5. Article

But Israel also has a short-term objective — and that is to play for time. Israel notes that its 1981 bombing of a nuclear reactor in Iraq set back Saddam Hussein's program — and did not result in some sort of massive retaliation. Something similar happened with the 2007 bombing of a Syrian installation. Neithe

e modest number of outside ground troops. They could be partly modeled on the protection we afforded Kurds in Iraq throughout the 1990s, even while Saddam was still in power. Alas, this task would be harder here. There is no natural geographic or demographic logic to any particular possible safe zone

ing of a nuclear reactor in Iraq set back Saddam Hussein's program — and did not result in some sort of ma

tances, it may be the best we can hope for—even if it requires uncomfortable talk of military intervention. Michael 0 'Hanlon is a senior fellow at Brookings and coauthor with Martin Indyk and Kenneth Lieberthal of Bending History: Barack Obama's Foreign Policy. EFTA00660567

n a telephone interview. But even more present in the minds of today's Iranians, according to Mousavian, was Washington's bias in the 1980s toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq after it invaded Iran. Mousavian said that some 300,000 Iranians were killed or injured in the eight years of war that ensued and that U.S. p

been more successful than that of many other former parts of the Eastern Bloc. This "constitutional moment" was lost in Iraq after the toppling of Saddam and in Afghanistan after the toppling of the Taliban in part because of heavy-handed American drives to shape the constitutions in ways that the U.

was Washington's bias in the 1980s toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq after it invaded Iran. Mousavian said tha

ections. It was at this time, Mousavian said, that Iran, now under Khamenei, decided "to go for self-sufficiency for fuel." The reason, he said at Brookings, was that the French halted a prior enrichment agreement. Under that plan, Iran paid $1.2 billion for a joint facility inside France. But technical

d that alongside Choudary, a Canadian man, Khaled Hussein, was arrested upon arrival at Heathrow Airport a

the military's norms, interests, and politics have shaped its behavior. On July 25, two years after the coup, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a virtual discussion on the findings from Grewal's new book and the evolution of Tunisia's military. Expert panelists will examine key que

ng a driver's license scam, it was the beginning of a long and controversial relationship. Coll was an Albany-based FBI agent focused on terrorism. Hussain, facing criminal charges and deportation after the 2002 bust, agreed to become an informant and operative. Together, Coll and Hussain would zero in

and regions responded to these commitments? What challenges do non-state actors confront? On May 1, The Center for Sustainable Development (CSD) at Brookings will host an online public EFTA00160428 event to explore what measures will be needed in the next year to ensure that a net-zero future remains w