Epstein Secrets

support both a narrow or broad application of the federal criminal law, "the tie must go to the defendant." United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. and Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S (June 2, 2008), Slip Op. at 6. 2 February 25, 2003 Trafficking in Persons National Security Presidential Directive. EFTA

or intimidation. These are the elements required by the statute, and they are not met here. Although CEOS could, perhaps, point to United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2007) as a case that, standing alone, involved wholly intrastate conduct, the facts of that case are far different in key

co-conspirators. None of this type of activity comes close to the facts regarding Mr. Epstein. Finally, but significantly, the prostitution ring in Evans was not, in fact, entirely intrastate as the companion case of one of the Evans co-defendants makes clear. See, United States v. Madison, 477 F.3d 1

previously set forth herein, and as more fully explained in other submissions related to this case, the recent Supreme Court decisions in Santo and Cuellar make this attempted stretch of the law improper. EFTA00013796 --- PAGE BREAK --- ALLEN GUTHRIE MCHUGH & THOMAS, PLLC Mr. John Roth June 19, 200

solicitation under State law. After all, prostitution, even when the allegations involve minors, is fundamentally a State concern, United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, n.1 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that federal law "does not criminalize all acts of prostitution (a vice traditionally governed by state

sufficient—cannot survive either a "plain language" test or the rule of lenity as they have been authoritatively construed in the recent Santos and Cuellar cases. The statute cannot be read otherwise. As the Cuellar decision makes clear, a proper interpretation of a federal criminal statute is guided "

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

or intimidation. These arc the elements required by the statute, and they are not met here. Although CEOS could, perhaps, point to United Slat% v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176 (11°' Cir. 2007) as a case that, standing alone, involved wholly intrastate conduct, the facts of that case are far different in key

it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to do here with

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

or intimidation. These are the elements required by the statute, and they are not met here. Although CEOS could, perhaps, point to United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2007) as a case that, standing alone, involved wholly intrastate conduct, the facts of that case are far different in key

it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to do here with

to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court’s very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court’s interpretive methodology when it comes to federal criminal law—powerfully demonstrate the subst

or intimidation. These are the elements required by the statute, and they are not met here. Although CEOS could, perhaps, point to United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176 (11" Cir. 2007) as a case that, standing alone, involved wholly intrastate conduct, the facts of that case are far different in key re

s co-conspirators. None of this type of activity comes close to the facts regarding Mr. Epstein. Finally, but significantly, the prostitution ring in Evans was not, in fact, entirely intrastate as the companion case of one of the Evans co-defendants makes clear. See, United States v. Madison, 477 F.3d 13

e shown that Mr. Epstein violated any of the three federal statutes identified by prosecutors. As the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar make clear, federal law may not be stretched in that manner, and the current federal investigation relies, as its foundation, on impermissibly elas

solicitation under State law. After all, prostitution, even when the allegations involve minors, is fundamentally a State concern, United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, n.1 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that federal law "does not criminalize all acts of prostitution (a vice traditionally governed by state