Epstein Secrets

pped phone line to its advantage. Consider, for =xample, the tapped phone of Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak. On =ecember 1, 2016, Kislyak went to Trump Tower to meet Jared Kushner and =ichael Flynn. According to Kushner's version of that meeting, =islyak suggested that Russian generals could supply infor

sumption which, following the =efection of Edward Snowden to Russia, is hard to make prudently—t=en the in

ations =rom Russia. If one assumes that the Russians do not know that the =hannel is being monitored—an assumption which, following the =efection of Edward Snowden to Russia, is hard to make prudently—t=en the intelligence gleaned from that channel can reveal the =remlin's activities and motive. If, however, i

’s team continued through the Republican Convention in Cleveland, when it was still hardly possible to conceive of Trump’s election. They moved on to Trump Tower with a voluble Steve Bannon—before the election, when he still seemed like an entertaining oddity, and later, after the election, when he seemed like

ence community’s unambiguous assessment of Edward Snowden as a betrayer of national secrets rather than a w

their horror of Donald Trump. Much of the left—which had resoundingly and scathingly rejected the intelligence community’s unambiguous assessment of Edward Snowden as a betrayer of national secrets rather than a well-intentioned whistle-blower—now suddenly embraced the intelligence community’s authority in its s

ost preposterous meetings in modern politics. On June 9, 2016, Don Jr., Jared, and Paul Manafort met with a movieworthy cast of dubious characters in Trump Tower after having been promised damaging information about Hillary Clinton. Don Jr., encouraged by Jared and Ivanka, was trying to impress his father that

70 Slate, 98-99 Slovenia, 15 Smith, Justin, 78 Snowden, Edward, 42, 95 Soros, George, 178 Special Opera