Epstein Secrets

s not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them." Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); accord Vasquez v. State, 777 So.2d 1200, 1203 (Fla. App. 2001). The reason for this rule "is both logical an

f the most persuasive character.'" Fraser v. Security and Inv. Corp., 615 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla. 4" Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-154 (1923) (Brandeis, J.). In the circumstances of this case, a reasonable finder of fact would have "evidence of the most

e to permit an adverse inference to be drawn from exercise of the privilege does not implicate the policy considerations underlying the privilege." Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.308, 335 (1976). An adverse inference is entirely justified in this case. Epstein has remained silent when asked such strai

ed long ago, "[s]ilence is often evidence of the most persuasive character."' Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923)). This is plainly one of those situations. In a civil case, drawing an adverse inference is the proper action

s not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.” Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); Accord, Vasquez v. State, 777 So. 2d 1200, 1203 (Fla. at 2001). The reason for this rule “is both logical an

ity and Inv. Corp., 615 So.2d 19 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_013388 --- PAGE BREAK --- 841, 842 (Fla. 4"" Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-154 (1923) (Brandeis, J.). In the circumstances of this case, a reasonable finder of fact would have “evidence of the mo