Epstein Secrets

until, at the earliest, a suspect's initial appearance before a judicial officer. U.S. Const. Amend. 6. *1246 On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, D.C. Docket No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Attorneys and Law Firms Paul Cassell, University of Utah Co

words of the statute as they are commonly and ordinarily understood and must construe the statute so each of its provisions is given full effect." P United States it McLymont, 45 F.3d 400, 401 (I I th Cir. 1995). Therefore, "[w]e do not look at one word or term in isolation, but instead we look to the entire

nt Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001). We are bound to "presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said." Id. (quoting P. United States it Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en bane)); see alsol° Keene Corp., 508 U.S. at 208, 113 S.Ct. 2035. Therefore, under the plain la

the Majority, Judge Tjoflat's concurring opinion, and I agree that the Executive has exclusive and complete authority over charging decisions. See? li United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) ("[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to deci

dment's Confrontation Clause, the "lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness" is a "question of reasonableness"); ? II Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) ("We have long held that the 'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.' "); 3

istent with how our circuit and others have articulated the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Villasenor. 608 F.3d 467. 471-72 (9th Cir.2010); United Stales v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940.945-46 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116. 120 n. 2 (3d Cit 1994); United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545.

010). Reasonable suspicion is required precisely because the individual has regained an expectation of privacy by moving away from the border. See United Slates v. Villasenor. 608 F.3d 467.471-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, —U.S., 131 S.Ct. 547. 178 L.Ed.2d 401 (2010); United States v. Whiting. 781 F.2d 692.

bing a functional border search and those describing an extended border search, not in defining the standard for a search at the border. See, e.g., United States v. Cardona, 769 F.2d 625, 628 (9th Cir.1985) ("We have recently recognized the difficulty of making sharp distinctions between searches at the func

he Court has expressed support for the deterrence value of suspicionless searches of a routine nature, such as vehicle checkpoints near the border. See United States v. Maninez— Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) ("We note here only the substantiality of the public interest in the p

ng electronic from non-electronic devices— of the *978 sort the Supreme Court has made clear has no place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 1 l7 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996)—is arbitrary; there is no reason someone carrying a laptop should receive greater privacy

bsection (a)(8)'s general right to fair treatment by reference to the subsections (and their constituent rights) that precede it. See, Johnson it United States,559 U.S. 133, 139,130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) ("Ultimately, context determines meaning ...."); Pi Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 255, 120 S.

iple— which dates back centuries—that "the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case." 1/ United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (citing Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1869)). 23 *12

aw is clear, at least for Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel purposes, that a "prosecution" does not begin with the criminal complaint's filing. See P. United States v. Alvarado, 440 F.3d 191, 199-200 (4th Cir. 2006) ("The filing of a federal criminal complaint does not commence a formal prosecution."); see als

24-25, 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (2003) (for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the execution of a warrant is subject to a reasonableness standard); Ohio v. Robinette 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) ("We have long held that the 'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.");