Epstein Secrets

plea from state court in federal proceeding). The victims intend to admit the correspondence to prove violations of the Act allegedly committed by the United States, not "against" Epstein. And even if rescission of the non-prosecution agreement abuts Epstein's interests, the purpose of the admission does not cha

o power to compel the custodian of the material to risk a contempt citation for his refusal to comply" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Overby. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 224 F.2d 158, 162 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1955) (exercising interlocutory jurisdiction and citing Perlman in a civil action to recover damage

a privilege); Krane, 625 F.3d at 572 (ruling that "Perlman and Mohawk are not in tension" when the claimant of a privilege is not a party). But see United States'. Copar Pumice Co., Inc., 714 F.3d 1197, 1207-09 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that jurisdiction under the Perlman doctrine is limited to only the grand

es only to grand jury subpoenas. Perlman' United States, 247 U.S. 7, 38 S. Ct. 417 (1918). Second, they argue that a decision of the Supreme Court, Mohawk Industries, Inc.I Carpenter, 558 U .S . 100, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009), forecloses an interlocutory appeal of a denial of a claim of privilege. 8 EFTA00209748 Case:

nts and assure the vitality of the attorney-client privilege." Id. Rather than cite this recent, controlling decision, Epstein's relies on Perlman' United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), as grounds for an interlocutory appeal. Of course, appellate court jurisdiction is typically confined to "final" judgments of th

l only serve to delay the victims effort to vindicate their rights under the CVRA, a clear indication that the public interest is not being served. See United States. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012) ("Frustration of federal statutes and prerogatives are not in the public interest ...."). In a trans

ge litigation is a paradigmatic example of when interlocutory appeals are proper, the Supreme Court has recently and flatly concluded otherwise. In Mohawk Industries, Inc. I Carpenter, 130 S.Ct. 599 (2009), an opinion that immediately appears when performing basic research on this issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the

unications from disclosure to third parties outside the negotiation process. 3. Whether this Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918). EFTA00209671 Case: 13-12923 Date Filed: 08/05/2013 Page: 16 of 75 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS In Septembe

tomary practices of the defense and prosecution function, entitled to assume would remain confidential and would not be disclosed to third parties. See United States v. Deloitte UP, 610 F.3d 129, 141 (D.C.Cir. 2010)(court "examine[s] whether the disclosing party had a reasonable basis for believing that the reci

State University, 495 Fed. Appx. 286 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 991 (2013) 55 *Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) 12, 35,36 Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) 46, 47, 48, 49, 51 EFTA00209664 Case: 13-12923 Date Filed: 08/05/2013 Page: 9 of 75 Moulder v. State, 154 I

v. Morgan State University, 495 Fed. Appx. 286, 289 (4th Cir. 2012); the Ninth Circuit has applied Perlman in a case arising under 28 U.S.C. §2255, United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974, 977 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012), and in a civil case, S.E.C. v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 656 F.3d 829, 830-31 (9th Cir. 2011); the Si

d by the work product privilege, it stopped short of advocating the recognition of a settlement/plea negotiation privilege under Rules 410 and 501. See United States' Response to Supplemental Briefing in Support of Motion to Intervene (Doc. 100). The government's institutional interests differ significantly from t

be disclosed to plaintiffs. Opposition at 2-3. Intervenors did not, however, ignore controlling Supreme Court precedent, for the simple reason that Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009), does not affect the intervenors' ability to take an appeal from this Court's disclosure order. There are two EFT

v. Morgan State University, 495 Fed. Appx. 286, 289 (4th Cir. 2012); the Ninth Circuit has applied Perlman in a case arising under 28 U.S.C. §2255, United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974, 977 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012), and in a civil case, S.E.C. v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 656 F.3d 829, 830-31 (9th Cir. 2011); the Si

be disclosed to plaintiffs. Opposition at 2-3. Intervenors did not, however, ignore controlling Supreme Court precedent, for the simple reason that Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009), does not affect the intervenors' ability to take an appeal from this Court's disclosure order. There are two EFT

firming 11th Circuit decision that an attorney-client rivilege order is not immediately appealable). As you probably know, Epstein plans to rely in United States' Perlman as the basis for an interlocutory appeal. Our understanding is that the Justice Department has long sought to give a narrow construction to

rcuit. Our understanding of DOD's position on interlocutory appeals is that they are notimnissible in these circumstances, particularly in light of Mohawk Industries, Inc. I Carpenter, 130 =. 599 (2009) (affirming 11th Circuit decision that an attorney-client rivilege order is not immediately appealable). As you proba

firming 11th Circuit decision that an attorney-client rivilege order is not immediately appealable). As you probably know, Epstein plans to rely in United States' Perlman as the basis for an interlocutory appeal. Our understanding is that the Justice Department has long sought to give a narrow construction to

uit. Our understanding of DOD's position on interlocutory appeals is that they are not permissible in these circumstances, particularly in light of Mohawk Industries, Inc. I Carpenter, 130 S.C.t. 599 (2009) (affirming 11th Circuit decision that an attorney-client rivilege order is not immediately appealable). As you pr

plea from state court in federal proceeding). The victims intend to admit the correspondence to prove violations of the Act allegedly committed by the United States, not "against" Epstein. And even if rescission of the non-prosecution agreement abuts Epstein's interests, the purpose of the admission does not cha

only to grand jury subpoenas. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 38 S. Ct. 417 (1918). Second, they argue that a decision of the Supreme Court, Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U .S . 100, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009), forecloses an interlocutory appeal of a denial of a claim of privilege. 8 EFTA00209639 Cas

to Mr. Epstein's attorneys was produced to plaintiffs, not correspondence authored by Mr. Epstein's counsel during the course of the negotiations. See United States' Response to Supplemental Briefing in Support of Motion to Intervene (Doc. 100) at 2 ("To the knowledge of the government, the Jane Does have only r

ssed herein, has jurisdiction to hear their appeal under Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918); contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, nothing in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U .S. 100 (2009), undercuts the Court's exercise of Perhnan jurisdiction in this case. While the underlying CVRA action was comme

to Mr. Epstein's attorneys was produced to plaintiffs, not correspondence authored by Mr. Epstein's counsel during the course of the negotiations. See United States' Response to Supplemental Briefing in Support of Motion to Intervene (Doc. 100) at 2 ("To the knowledge of the government, the Jane Does have only r

herein, has jurisdiction to hear their appeal under Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), and, contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, nothing in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009), undercuts the Court's exercise of Perlman jurisdiction in this case. While the underlying CVRA action was comme