Epstein Secrets

hat they were members of conspiracy pursuant to New York long-arm statute, or that they had any general business contacts with United States. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 et seq.; N.Y.McKinney's CPLR 302(a)(2). 68. Federal Courts C=97 Jurisdictional discovery was warrant- ed, at dismissal stage of Antiterrori

rrorism Act (ATA) suit by survivors of victims of September 11, 2001 attacks, as to issue whether company purposefully directed its activities at United Slates, for purposes of personal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 et seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(2), 28 U.S.CA. 101. Federal Civil Procedure (3=

ts with the United States generally, but in- sufficient contacts with any one state in particular. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee's note; United Stales v. Intl. Bhd, of Teamsters, 945 F.Supp. 609, 616- 17 (S.D.N.Y.1996). For jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), there must be a federal claim, personal

dismissed for lack of per- sonal jurisdiction. 3. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Jurisdic- tional Discovery as to Privatbank's Investing Activities in the United States [37] Plaintiffs point out that Privat- bank's website and its 2001 Annual Report state that Privatbank engages in transac- tions involving securiti

some conceivable non-discretionary tortious act falls within the purview of these generic allegations under the appli- cable substantive law. 28 U.S.C.A. 1605(a)(5). 28. International Law C=10.33 In determining whether functions are discretionary, for purposes of the discre- tionary function except

States in the years 1992-1998, a period that includes the relevant period in this action and five preceding years. See In re Magnetic Au- diotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d at 207- 08; see also, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 569-70 (holding that the time peri- od relevant for determining extent of a

t could have filed a writ of mandamus, since "mandamus lies to compel a judge to unseal documents shown to be material and necessary in litigation," United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 1983). But the Government has done neither of the above; instead, it has moved pursuant to the All Writs Act. I

odification on these grounds, I address this factor in light of the current proceedings before the Second Circuit. The term is not well understood. See United States v. Talco Contractors, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 501, 511 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that the Circuit "provided no guidance as to what might constitute `impr

hat reliance was reasonable, where a protective order is, as here, a blanket order entered by stipulation of the parties." In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 164 F.R.D. 346, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). As for the last factor, the nature of the parties' reliance on the order does seem to weigh against modifica

t could have filed a writ of mandamus, since "mandamus lies to compel a judge to unseal documents shown to be material and necessary in litigation," United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 1983). But the Government has done neither of the above; instead, it has moved pursuant to the All Writs Act. I

odification on these grounds, I address this factor in light of the current proceedings before the Second Circuit. The term is not well understood. See United States v. Talco Contractors, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 501, 511 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that the Circuit "provided no guidance as to what might constitute `impr

hat reliance was reasonable, where a protective order is, as here, a blanket order entered by stipulation of the parties." In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 164 F.R.D. 346, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). As for the last factor, the nature of the parties' reliance on the order does seem to weigh against modifica

NDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF INTERVENORS' MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE AND TO MODIFY THE PROTECTIVE ORDER STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 1114 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10036 (212) 506-3900 October 5, 2017 CONFIDENTIAL - FILED UNDER SEAL EFTA00805389 TABLE OF CONTENTS PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

er. First, the Protective Order is broadly drafted and the Court has great latitude to amend a protective order with such a broad scope. In re EPDM Antitrust Litig., 255 F.R.D. 308, 319 (D. Conn. 2009) (a blanket protective order is "more likely to be subject to modification than a more specific, targeted order