Epstein Secrets

t could have filed a writ of mandamus, since "mandamus lies to compel a judge to unseal documents shown to be material and necessary in litigation," United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 1983). But the Government has done neither of the above; instead, it has moved pursuant to the All Writs Act. I

odification on these grounds, I address this factor in light of the current proceedings before the Second Circuit. The term is not well understood. See United States v. Talco Contractors, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 501, 511 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that the Circuit "provided no guidance as to what might constitute `impr

r by the Plaintiff or her lawyers." (Def.'s Reply in Further Supp. of Mot. for Protective Order, 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 49 at 5); cf. Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[O]ne of the primary reasons the protective order was originally entered was to prevent plaintiffs from u

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

independent basis to modify a protective order under Martindell notwithstanding the parties' reasonable reliance on that order. See Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296). Thus, even assuming that the Government should have told Judge McMah

ts '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

independent basis to modify a protective order under Martindell notwithstanding the parties' reasonable reliance on that order. See Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296). Thus, even assuming that the Government should have told Judge McMah

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

independent basis to modify a protective order under Martindell notwithstanding the parties' reasonable reliance on that order. See Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296). Thus, even assuming that the Government should have told Judge McMah

t could have filed a writ of mandamus, since "mandamus lies to compel a judge to unseal documents shown to be material and necessary in litigation," United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 1983). But the Government has done neither of the above; instead, it has moved pursuant to the All Writs Act. I

odification on these grounds, I address this factor in light of the current proceedings before the Second Circuit. The term is not well understood. See United States v. Talco Contractors, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 501, 511 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that the Circuit "provided no guidance as to what might constitute `impr

tor by the Plaintiff or her lawyers." (Def's Reply in Further Supp. of Mot. for Protective Order, 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 49 at 5); of Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[O]ne of the primary reasons the protective order was originally entered was to prevent plaintiffs from u

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

independent basis to modify a protective order under Martindell notwithstanding the parties' reasonable reliance on that order. See Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296). Thus, even assuming that the Government should have told Judge McMah

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

independent basis to modify a protective order under Martindell notwithstanding the parties' reasonable reliance on that order. See Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296). Thus, even assuming that the Government should have told Judge McMah